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Southern Africa‟s viability as a monetary union has long been under discussion. The 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the world‟s oldest operating customs union, 
and one of the most efficient and it has the potential to foster meaningful regional 
economic integration. A strong foundation has been laid down by the SACU member 
countries in terms of trade relations, financial cooperation and policy coordination. Using 
the optimum currency areas (OCA) theory, the study examines the readiness and 
compatibility of the SACU member countries to establish an optimum currency area. The 
OCA theory reveals that SACU members are in very good shape and already exhibit some 
attributes necessary for forming an optimum currency area (OCA).  
 
The empirical evidence suggest that, from an economic perspective, it is feasible for 
SACU countries to move towards a fully-fledge monetary union because of the increasing 
macroeconomic convergence, and this means that the countries are undergoing similar 
shocks. The deeper trade relation that exists between SACU member states seems to have 
important influence on business cycle co-movements. Accordingly, the study concludes 
SACU has advanced its integration more than what is required in a Customs Union and 
that a monetary union within SACU is feasible, given the macroeconomic convergence, 
similar production structures and risk-hedging possibilities of member countries and 
because peripheral countries are able to resort to South Africa‟s capital market and 
overdraft facilities. 
 
However, the absence of real political will among the member countries will be a major 
stumbling block in the formation of a monetary union. It is important to note that even the 
formation of the EMU was not exclusively driven by economic merits per se, but also by 
the real political will, which had a major influence on its realisation. Such strong political 
will and unity on issues around the formation of the common currency would be needed to 
SACU countries to override issues of national interest and, the study therefore 
recommends that SACU countries should draw lessons from the EMU and CFA Franc 
zone model as these are empowered supranational authorities that have counteracted 
sovereignty and other political concerns to bring about meaningful and deepening 
economic integration in the region.  
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Globalisation has brought about enormous growth in international trade, and it has also 
resulted in regional initiatives globally. Regional initiatives are a common feature of the 
modern world‟s geopolitical and economic integration. Many countries are collaborating 
within various regional schemes in order to secure and access the world market. It is 
reasonable to expect most individual countries with small in scale economies to seek the 
cooperation of regional neighbours. As Oyejide (2000:5) argues, “such countries in the 
context of an appropriate regional integration scheme would bring about a sufficiently 
large market size to generate lower production cost that might enable the integrated 
region to compete better with the rest of the world.”  
 
Similarly, Akinbobola and Akinlo (2005) argue that the reality of a contemporary 
international system is such that no country can independently and entirely advance its 
economic, cultural, strategic, military and even political goals in seclusion. Manifestly, 
the world has come to accept this as a universal trend, as evident in the recent economic 
cooperation marked by the emergence of a number of key regional blocs, such as the 
European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).  
 
Many African states have identified regional economic integration as an important means 
for promoting economic growth and sustainable development. They see regional 
economic integration as a mechanism for developing multilateral trade and economic 
linkages, with the intention of achieving better assimilation into the global economy. 
Consequently, organisations aiming to chart the path toward an economic union litter the 
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African continent. These include the African Union (AU); the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East 
African Community (EAC); the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA).  
 
Increasing globalisation and the ongoing marginalization of the African countries‟ 
economies from the global economic system has prompted the development of regional 
cooperative efforts in Africa. This has fuelled the likes of Owusu-Ampomah (2002) to 
call for African countries to intensify regional cooperation efforts and to ensure 
sustainable development in order to achieve global competitiveness and integration, and 
economic growth. Regional economic integration in Africa, as well as cooperation, can 
promote economic growth and sustainable development, and open up new opportunities 
for private sector growth. 
 
African countries need to establish strong economic cooperation in order to protect 
Africa‟s interest and avoid further marginalisation from the global economy. Sound 
macroeconomic policies that spouse sustainable economic development must 
complement such economic cooperation. This study focuses on SACU, with a view to 
establishing the benefits strengthening the economic integration of countries within the 
Southern African bloc through establishing an optimum currency area.   
 
1.2  Background to the study 
SACU is the oldest customs union in the world and is arguably the “most successful” 
regional integration model in Africa at present (African Development Bank Report, 
1993; Hansohm & Adongo, 2006). Formed in 1910, SACU members comprise 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland (Venter & Neuland, 2007). 
SACU encompasses 2.74 million square kilometres on the southern tip of the African 
continent and a total population of 51.9 (Langton, 2008). South Africa is a key player in 
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the region; accounting for 87 % of the population and 93 % ($107, 53 billion) of the 
GDP in 2005.  SACU had a combined real GDP of about $158 billion (Langton, 2008:3).  
 
The need to develop meaningful trade and economic cooperation, market liberalisation, 
economic growth and development and monetary cooperation informed the 
establishment of SACU (Hentz, 2005:1). Subsequently to its formation, SACU signed a 
treaty to abolish all import duties between its members and implemented a common 
external tariff (CET) for all non-members of the customs union. The CET has 
strengthened SACU‟s bargaining power and thus, SACU has increasingly taken over 
national agreements (SACU, 2007). The 1969 agreement has remained fundamental to 
member states and the 2002 agreement was passed as an amendment of the original 
agreement.  
 
The 2002 agreement democratises all of SACU‟s decision-making (i.e. over tariffs and 
customs union revenue). According to Hansohm and Adongo (2006), SACU has moved 
in a direction of espousing a “true” regional integration scheme. One of the critical 
provisions in this agreement is that member countries may not enter into new preferential 
trade agreements with third parties without the consent of other members (SACU, 2007). 
This stance has proved to be important for two main reasons: First, it gives preference to 
a multilateral framework agreement(s). Second, it implicitly enforces the members‟ 
commitment to the customs union. Members of SACU have also established a 
compensation formula to mitigate the negative effects that a customs union might have 
on the less developed members (Hentz, 2005:1).  
 
The main objective of SACU has always been, and still is, to encourage economic trade 
and diversification, and development of member countries, especially of less advanced 
member countries, and to ensure equal sharing of benefits arising from intra-regional and 
international trade among the member countries (Venter & Neuland, 2007). According to 
Margaret (2003), SACU has demonstrated that it has the capacity to bring about 
meaningful regional economic integration. This assertion is supported by Erasmus 
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(2008:1) who also opines that, “SACU is part of a well-established regional architecture 
with benefits for public and private interests, consumers, agriculture, tourism, commerce, 
customs etc. It contributes to regional stability; with all the positive spin-offs for the 
region‟s international standing and for investment and development”. 
 
SACU has a long history of increasing intra-regional trade and economic cooperation 
between member states. However, it is apparent that the trade pattern in SACU tends to 
favour the regional superpower, South Africa. Most SACU imports are “sourced from or 
through South Africa... The other SACU member countries absorb about 25% of South 
Africa‟s manufactured exports and provide only 10% of the group total imports” 
(Oyejide, 2000:8). Maleke (2008) and Jenkins and Thomas (1997:vii) state that: 
 
 Members of SACU have reached a highly reasonable level of macroeconomic 
convergence. 
 Both fiscal and monetary policy stances appear to be more cautious on average 
among SACU members relative to other blocs, such as SADC. 
 There is a greater degree of fiscal convergence among SACU members than non 
SACU-SADC members. 
 There is a greater degree of interest convergence among SACU members than non 
SACU-SADC members; and  
 The degree of openness to international trade is, on average, much higher among 
SACU member countries relative to non-SACU SADC members. 
 
According to the African Development Bank Report (2004:i), SACU countries have 
reached a higher level of stability and macroeconomic convergence than the rest of the 
SADC countries in terms of their fiscal and monetary policies, inflation rates, interest 
rates as well as per capita incomes. SACU members‟ fiscal deficits are much lower than 
non-SACU SADC members‟, averaging 1.6 % of GDP for the period 2000-2003, whilst 
non-SACU SADC members average 5.6 %. In addition, all SACU members, with the 
exception of Lesotho, had relatively low external debt ratios of below 25 % of GDP, 
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while the remaining member states had debt to GDP ratios above 80 %, with Malawi 
being the most indebted country (ADBR, 2004:6-7). Jenkins and Thomas, (1997) and 
Duma (2000), note that macroeconomic convergence among SACU member countries 
has been fast and yet remains rather low for the rest of the SADC countries. Paramount 
among macroeconomic convergence within SACU is inflation rates, interest rates and 
real exchange rates (Maleke, 2008). The prevailing monetary cooperation that exists in 
this region, among other things, fuels this convergence. This creates fertile ground for 
more cohesive integration among the member states.  
 
Despite SACU being the most advanced regional scheme on the African continent, it has 
nevertheless been constrained by a set of problems similar to those faced by any other 
operating regional arrangement. Members of SACU have different economic profiles, 
but similar challenges, for instance, the issues of poverty alleviation and income 
distribution, HIV/AIDS as well as high unemployment confront them all. McCarthy 
(2008:1) states that the inequality in economic size and levels of development among the 
SACU member states is extreme, and this sometimes frustrates the progress of the 
customs union. South Africa contributes over 90 % of the SACU GDP and completely 
dominates other members in terms of size and because it is industrially advanced. This 
economic gap between member states remains a pressing concern that has the potential to 
thwart the effectiveness of the customs union.  
 
Another problem with SACU is that it does not have its own budget nor the authority to 
make laws that would effectively regulate and monitor areas of common interest. 
Members of SACU also lack a comprehensive industrial strategy aligned with the 
customs union‟s objectives. As Yang and Gupta (2005:6) argue that the common 
weakness of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in Africa is that they detract from their 
core objectives because a disjuncture exists between the union‟s objectives and the 
national trade policies of member countries and their administrative capacity constraints. 
In many cases, this lack of policy coherence results in the impotence of the entire 
regional arrangement since the central body assigned to implement the agreement in 
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many case often lacks the real authority and resources to act on its own initiatives while 
there is no focal point at national level with the ability to act. The failure to comply with 
the terms of agreements and poor implementation of programmes has been a generally a 
further hurdle to ensuring the effectiveness of regional schemes in Africa, and SACU is 
no stranger to these issues. Recently, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland signed the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) without the obtaining the agreement of all of 
the customs union‟s members. This contravenes one of the binding agreement provisions, 
namely that the customs union member countries may not enter into new preferential 
trade agreements with third parties without the consent of all of the other members 
(SACU, 2007). In light of the dispute over members signing the EPA, many speculate 
and fear that SACU could break up. However, the breakup of SACU would be a 
regressive event and that would particularly adversely affect the smaller member 
countries. Although, it is generally recognised that the current arrangement is perceived 
to be biased towards South Africa, according to McCarthy (1999a); the potential acts of 
retribution could occur if members attempted to secede from the union.  
 
The multiplicity and overlapping of memberships is also one of the pressing concerns in 
the customs union. All SACU members belong to the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and two members (Lesotho and Swaziland) belong to the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In effect, the overlapping 
memberships lead to contradictions in terms of policy objectives and loyalty to various 
treaties. This further reduces the ability of the customs union to pursue coherent and 
effective integration programmes. For instance, COMESA envisages launching a 
common currency by 2025 whilst SADC plans to launch a regional currency in 2018. 
Manifestly, this is indicative of the policy complexity dual membership causes, as 
organizations have different, if not conflicting, interests but both operate in the same 
region. SACU‟s limitations, in terms of its capacity to implement initiatives as well as 
insufficient commitment by members due to overlapping memberships, present this 
customs union with a serious problem. These types of constraints continue to have a 
negative impact on trade expansion and the strengthening of regional integration.  
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Moreover, SACU member countries Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (LNS) and South 
Africa are members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which requires convergence 
both in terms of their monetary and financial policies. The currencies of the LNS 
countries are on par with the South African rand (Grandes, 2003; Khamfula & Huizinga, 
2004). Thus, after Botswana decided to withdraw from the CMA arrangement, its 
“currency, the pula, has remained informally linked to the rand through a currency basket 
where, since 1990, the latter weighs around 60 to 70%, and hence, Botswana is regarded 
as a de facto member of CMA” (Aziakpono, 2008:190). Additionally, the CMA 
arrangement provides no restriction on both current and capital account transactions of 
its members (Aziakpono, 2008).  
 
Because of their CMA membership, economic activities in the LNS countries do not 
significantly affect the value of their currencies. The development of their exchange rates 
is mainly dependent on the underlying factors affecting the South African rand‟s 
performance against other currencies. The rand is a free-floating currency and is a legal 
tender in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (Aziakpono, 2003). The LNS countries follow 
policies that strongly reflect South Africa‟s preferences for sound finance and price 
stability. Because of their parity against the South African rand by currencies of other 
contracting parties, all of the CMA countries have the similar exchange rate against 
outside currencies. The small CMA members (with the exception of Swaziland) do not 
have the option of changing their exchange rates to attain or maintain external 
competitiveness (Grandes, 2003). The South African rand is playing the role of the 
anchor currency in the region, and, as a result, the economic activities of other SACU 
members are highly responsive to the South African monetary policy.  
 
The CMA members, together with Botswana, have demonstrated evidence of 
convergence throughout their history: they have shared similar currency; similar inflation 
rates and narrowly fluctuating real bilateral exchange rates. The CMA members hold 
regular consultations to facilitate and ensure continued compliance with the CMA and 
reconcile different interests in the formulation and implementation of monetary and 
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foreign exchange policies of the CMA. The presence of financial integration within 
SACU has been found by, among others, Aziakpono (2006; 2008), Matsaseng (2008) and 
Nielsen et al. (2005). Schiava (2008:170) argues that financially integrated economies 
tend to display better correlation of business cycles. Given their integrated financial 
system and close economic ties, it is not surprising that members of SACU experience 
similar business cycles. The CMA arrangement therefore forms an essential part of 
SACU. 
 
SACU has advanced its integration more than what is required in a Customs Union. 
Therefore, the movement towards a monetary (or currency) union is a necessary future 
development for the customs union members as they seek to build viable regional 
economic integration and, ultimately, to increase their output and incomes. This goal 
would be in line with the African Union‟s vision, namely the creation of a fully-fledged 
economic and political union in Africa. A currency area is a grouping of economies 
within which markets are sufficiently integrated and flexible to make use of a single 
currency (Mulhearn et al., 2001:363).  
 
SACU has always been subject to discourse about its viability as a monetary union. With 
an illustrious history of operational efficiency, SACU has demonstrated that it has the 
capacity to bring about meaningful regional economic integration. The exchange of 
currencies resulting from trade has become an important factor in the functioning of 
modern economies. Currencies serve as a standardised value of measurement and function 
as an efficient means of determining payment (Chabot, 1999:5). Furthermore, having a 
strong currency forms an important part of a country‟s general economic stability and 
stimulates investors‟ confidence because there is minimal exchange rate fluctuation, 
which in turn serves as a magnet for attracting foreign direct investment. 
 
Popular arguments in favour of a common currency peg for members of SACU include 
the following: Firstly, most SACU members are operating through a monetary union, 
although this type of integration is still in its infancy. The general perception is that 
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achieving a cohesive monetary union should be relatively easy, given the length of time 
these countries have been working together. Grandes (2003:23) argues that the CMA 
group, together with Botswana, can form an optimum currency area given the existence 
of common long-run trends in their bilateral real exchange rates. This argument depicts 
that there is a high degree of economic integration. In a similar vein, according to 
McCarthy (2010), Botswana could be the first candidate to join the CMA-turned-fully- 
fledged monetary union. Secondly, members of SACU are geographically close, have 
overlapping histories and have similar macroeconomic policies, which make them 
suitable candidates for joining a monetary union (or currency area).  
 
Thirdly, four members of SACU also belong to the CMA and Botswana is a de facto 
member of the CMA; thus, these SACU members have demonstrated convergence in 
terms of their inflation rates, interest rates and narrow fluctuating real bilateral exchange 
rates (Jenkins & Thomas, 1997; Grandes, 2003; Aziakpono, 2008). Furthermore, the 
CMA member states and Botswana have a similar set of policy preferences. This 
suggests stronger economic integration among SACU members will probably not be 
problematic. Moreover, this affects and forces macroeconomic convergence between 
SACU member states. Therefore, the business cycles of SACU members would not be 
very dissimilar and thus prevent any member from participating in a currency area.  
 
Lastly, the depth of financial integration, the synchronisation of the exchange rate regime 
and monetary policy among the SACU members shows a positive policy correlation and 
macroeconomic convergence, which makes SACU member states suitable to participate 
in a currency union. According to the African Development Bank Report (1993:239), 
“The conversion of SACU and Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA) into a common 
market arrangement with a monetary union for BLNS countries and South Africa would 
be the logical progression of a long history of economic cooperation to the higher level 




Several scholars, among them, McCarthy (2010), Aziakpono (2008) and Matsaseng 
(2008), have argued that the monetary unification amongst members of SACU is a 
feasible option. A common currency area requires macroeconomic policy convergence. 
This was apparent, for example, when the European Union introduced its currency, the 
Euro. Since SACU members have already displayed sustained macroeconomic 
convergence, they should also be suitable to participate in a common currency area 
(Jenkins & Thomas, 1997). Maleke (2008:70) further argues that the steady/stable level 
of co-movement on specific macroeconomic variables, such as exchange rates, inflation, 
financial integration, openness, GDP growth rate and interest rates, between SACU 
members is indicative of the great potential that exists for a common currency in this 
region. Such factors have prompted economists like Aziakpono (2008), Grandes (2003; 
2004) and Matsaseng (2008) to suggest that monetary unification and a common 
monetary policy with a common central bank are feasible for SACU.   
 
The adoption of one currency confers both benefits and costs. The former will be mainly 
in the form of lower transaction costs, price stability and the elimination of currency 
risks, and enhanced economic efficiency, which will strengthen the region‟s capacity to 
compete globally (Salvatore, 1998). The latter can help to overcome national 
governments‟ inability to pursue independent policies (exchange rate, monetary and 
fiscal) to stabilise their domestic economy (Gerber, 2005:347). A monetary union 
minimises the likelihood of macroeconomic instability and locks in policy reforms if 
agencies can effectively restrain governments from excessive intervention in the market. 
Maleke (2008:71) argues that the SACU member countries have made substantial 
progress towards establishing a single currency area and it is therefore prudent to sustain 
preparatory efforts.  
 
The principal benefits of establishing a common currency area is that it often cultivates 
sound market-oriented policies that promote best market practices in corporates and 
governments. Furthermore, the formation of an optimum currency area will instil 
discipline among SACU members and help them to formulate policies to deal with the 
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potential problems and challenges that increased interdependence in the global financial 
market creates. More importantly, a currency union will consolidate integration in other 
areas of the economy to further address market inefficiencies, and consolidate goods and 
financial markets. Thus, the currency union could inspire more confidence in the 
international capital market than an individual country could do single-handedly 
(Maleke, 2008).  
 
Moreover, it gives regional industries an opportunity to learn how to cope with 
competition in a wider regional market before fully entering the more fiercely 
competitive world market place. Grandes (2003; 2004) presents some detailed analysis of 
the costs and benefits that could be accrue to SACU member countries if they were to 
establish a fully-fledged monetary union. This provides a strong basis upon which to 
determine whether SACU members have the necessary attributes to form a common 
currency (or monetary) area. 
 
Admittedly, the process of establishing monetary integration will be difficult, but not 
impossible, and it will require effective management. It is, indeed, a very challenging 
task to establish a currency area. Europe spent several decades experimenting with 
regional monetary cooperation before adopting a single currency. The task may be even 
more challenging for SACU and its members, but the European experience could serve 
as a useful benchmark for SACU. SACU is in an advantageous position because the 
CMA arrangement has already laid the necessary foundation for a common currency. It 
is important to note that countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria for entering into a 
currency area scheme ex post than ex ante (Frankel & Rose, 1997:22).  
 
Regardless of economic conditions, one must be remember that the adoption of a 
common currency is also a political process that requires political will from member 
countries to sacrifice domestic policy needs for the sake of the currency union‟s needs. It 
is important that the governments provide leadership on this process. If member states‟ 
government do not provide political support and commitment, the process of achieving a 
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common currency will not succeed. The success of such initiatives requires leaders who 
will think beyond the short-term gains and consider the long-term benefits of regional 
cooperation. This is especially pertinent in the Southern African region, where poverty 
and under-development are widespread. 
 
In light of this background, this dissertation has sought to examine the viability of SACU 
and its members adopting the common currency area given the prevailing conditions in 
this customs union. The theoretical framework of Optimum Currency Areas (OCAs) that 
has been popularised by the early works of Robert Mundell (1961), Ronald McKinnon 
(1963) and Peter Kenen (1969), among others, has provided guidance in this endeavour. 
This theoretical framework offers the appropriate lens for scholars to interrogate the 
conditions amenable to establishing a common currency area.  
 
1.3  Problem statement and objectives 
This study seeks to examine the following hypothesis: Given the longstanding 
relationship between SACU members, their integration can be further entrenched if OCA 
criteria can be satisfied and these member countries seem to have the economic attributes 
necessary to adopt a common currency. The objectives of this study are:  
 
(i). To investigate the feasibility of a fully operational economic union within SACU and 
to determine whether a common currency area can be established with members of 
SACU; and 
(ii). To review relevant literature on optimum currency areas which addresses two key 
issues, namely the characteristics necessary for countries aspiring to establish a monetary 
(economic) union, and the major benefits and costs of monetary integration.  
 
Furthermore, the study aims to review the empirical evidence related to optimum 
currency areas and to draw some lessons from the global experience of monetary 
integration, making specific reference to the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
CFA Franc zone, as such examination could assist SACU in establishing a currency 
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union. In addition, the study reviews the history and organisational structure of SACU as 
well as the CMA arrangement and discusses its implications for SACU. Moreover, the 
study presents empirical evidence of macroeconomic interdependence among SACU 
countries, of gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth rates, consumer price index 
(CPI), interest rates exports and imports. Such interdependence is instrumental for any 
prospect of deeper economic integration. 
 
1.4  Method of research 
The research method used in this study is predominantly literature based as its key focus 
is to use the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) to benchmark whether the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) should form an OCA or not. Resources such 
as books, academic journals and internet sources have been the researcher‟s primary 
source of information.  
 
According to the theory of optimum currency areas, the greater the linkages between 
countries, the more viable it is for them to adopt the same currency and a common 
monetary policy. One such linkage is the degree of economic integration between the 
potential member countries of a currency area. Frankel and Rose (1998) assert that a 
group of countries are more likely to constitute a suitable monetary union if these 
countries‟ business cycles are highly correlated. Bitros and Korres (2002) argue that “the 
degree of convergence between economies in question can be identified by examining 
the degree of co-movement across the relevant time series.” Convergence can be 
determined by ascertaining the relationship between trends‟ movement in the set 
variables. The degree of convergence or non-convergence over the long term can be 
examined by analysing the significant correlation coefficient. 
 
In investigating the feasibility of a common currency in SACU, the study examines key 
macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth rates, 
consumer price index (CPI), interest rates, exports and imports in real terms. The 
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empirical method employed in this study takes the form of quantitative analysis. The 
researcher used the most common correlation coefficient - the Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient (r) - to test for a correlation of macroeconomic variable of the five 
countries (SACU). The data was primarily sourced from various sources, namely the 
IMF- International Financial Statistics, the United Nations Statistical Division, the 
Central Bank of Botswana, the Central Bank of Lesotho, the Central Bank of Namibia, 
the Central Bank of Swaziland, and the African Development Indicators. The sample 
period runs from 1970 to 2008, as the data was reliable during this time. Due to data 
limitations for sample countries, some observations in our sample do not cover entirely 
cover the period under study  
 
1.5  Contribution and relevance of the study 
Europe‟s successful establishment of the Euro currency has inspired many regions to 
consider launching their own currencies. In Southern Africa, it is clear that there is a 
growing eagerness to accelerate regional integration through creating a common currency 
area. The viability of a monetary union in Southern Africa has become a recurring 
discourse recently. SADC has publicly expressed its intention to establish a monetary 
union by 2018. Creating a monetary union within SACU could provide the basis for the 
SADC‟s envisaged monetary union.  
 
Masson and Pattillo (2004:12) posit achieving a common currency in Africa can only 
occur if there is successful integration of existing currency areas within regional African 
economic communities. They also argue that “a selective expansion of the CMA might 
be mutually desirable for existing and some new, members” (Masson & Pattillo, 2004:3). 
In a similar vein, McCarthy (2010:2) argues that the CMA presents the “best prospects 
for first seeking then expanding the membership of the monetary union”. This study 
seeks to contribute to the discourse on the matter, by investigating whether SACU 




1.6  Limitations of the study 
The primary limitation in this study was the unavailability of the data. As a result, the 
analysis only covered the period from 1970 to 2008. This period was chosen because it 
was difficult to obtain a reliable data on the countries under study for other periods, 
particularly for the smaller members (Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia). For instance, it 
was difficult to obtain data on CPI and interest rates which, forces the researcher to 
analyse and only covered the period from 1975 to 2008 and 1990 to 2008, in these 
indicators respectively. Hence, the analysis is only of the key macroeconomic indicators, 
with the latter being based on a set of data involving the five SACU member countries.  
 
1.7  Organisation of the study 
The study is set out as follows. Chapter 1 describes the background of the study, its 
objectives and problem statement. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on optimum currency 
areas, and addresses two key issues, namely the characteristics that are necessary for 
countries aspiring to establish a monetary (economic) union, and the major benefits and 
costs of monetary integration. Chapter 3 examines empirical evidence on optimum 
currency areas. It also draw reflects on some lessons derived from the global experience 
of monetary integration with a specific reference to the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the CFA Franc zone, as this could assist SACU in establishing a currency 
area. Chapter 4 reviews the history and organisational structure of SACU. Chapter 5 
reviews the “Rand Monetary Area” and discusses its implications for SACU. It also 
assesses SACU members‟ compatibility and suitability for establishing a common 
currency area based on the OCA criteria. Chapter 6 presents the empirical evidence, 
focusing on the correlation of SACU member countries‟ key set of macroeconomic 









THE OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
An optimum currency area (OCA) is a framework for monetary integration. The OCA 
theory deals with factors that ensure the viability of a monetary union and the requisite 
economic characteristics countries, or regions, need to join a monetary union. In the 
1960s, Robert Mundell (1961), Ronald McKinnon (1963), and Peter Kenen (1969) 
propounded and popularised the OCA theory. The OCA theory helps to identify an 
appropriate domain for adopting a common currency, and possibly estimates the costs 
and benefits thereof. A currency area is a domain in which exchange rates are irrevocably 
pegged, or where a single currency circulates, and a single monetary policy is adopted 
and implemented at a union-defined level (Mongelli, 2002:2). Mundell (1961) defines an 
OCA in terms of factor mobility, but within which exchange rates are fixed. In Mundell‟s 
(1961:659) own words:  
 
In a currency area comprising different countries with national currencies 
the pace of employment in deficit countries is set by the willingness of 
surplus countries to inflate. But in a currency area comprising many regions 
and a single currency, the pace of inflation is set by the willingness of 
central authorities to allow unemployment in deficit regions. 
 
…But a currency area of either type cannot prevent both unemployment 
and inflation among its members. The fault lies not with the type of 
currency area, but with the domain of the currency area. The optimum 
currency area is not the world. 
 
McKinnon (1963:717) further defines an OCA as a single currency area within which 
monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external exchange rates can be used to resolve three 
(sometimes conflicting) objectives: (1) full employment; (2) external balance; and (3) 
price stability. These objectives, however, are impossible to achieve simultaneously. 
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Kenen (1969:41) expands on the notion of an OCA and offers a similar definition: “If the 
prevailing exchange rate regime, fixed or flexible, can maintain external balance without 
causing unemployment (or on the other side demand-induce wages inflation), that regime 
is optimal”. This chapter provides an overview of optimum currency area (OCA) theory, 
the characteristics that are desirable in countries wanting to participate in a currency area 
and the costs and benefits of such participation.  
 
2.2  The OCA theory 
The OCA theory is an approach to discussing monetary integration. This brings up 
Mundell‟s important question: What is the appropriate domain for a currency area? The 
OCA theory has been fundamental in shaping Europe‟s Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). There are two major approaches to studying and evaluating the appropriate 
domain for a common currency area. The first approach is the traditional approach; this 
approach attempts to find the crucial economic characteristics of an appropriate domain. 
The second approach is the cost-benefit approach. According to Ishiyama (1975:78), this 
approach appears to be better at providing a unified framework that takes the economic 
characteristics of the region/domain into account as well as evaluates the costs and 
benefits for a country intending to participate in a currency area 
 
2.2.1  The traditional approach (1960s-1970s) 
The traditional approach tries to single out the crucial criteria of an appropriate domain; 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) have significantly shaped the 
traditional approach to OCA theory. The traditional approach provides the theoretical 
framework for monetary integration and identifies the exchange rate regime as pivotal. It 
concentrates on identifying the most relevant characteristics in choosing appropriate 
currency area partners, or in using a common currency optimally throughout the domain. 
With a traditional approach, an optimal common currency and suitable currency union 




2.2.1.1  Capital and labour mobility (Mundell, 1961) 
In his seminal contribution to monetary cooperation, A Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas, Mundell (1961) raises the concept of capital and labour mobility as a basis for 
participating in a unified currency area. His main argument is that where capital and 
labour mobility exist between countries intending to participate in a currency area, there 
is less necessity for exchange rate variation to correct disequilibrium. Mundell (1961:66) 
argues that if the degree of factor mobility between two countries is high, they are good 
candidates for a currency area, because the high factor mobility will substitute for 
exchange rate variation adjusting for asymmetric demand shocks and it makes flexible 
exchange rates less volatile. The assumption that a demand shift causes the balance of 
payment disequilibrium forms the basis of Mundell‟s argument.  
 
For example, suppose two countries join a currency area, as in Mundell‟s example, and 
assuming that an asymmetric demand shock negatively affected the output of country B, 
“To the extent that prices are allowed to rise in A, the change in terms of trade will 
relieve B of some of the burden of adjustment” (Mundell, 1961:658). This adjustment 
means the trade-off between inflation and unemployment ensures the prevention of 
unemployment in country B because country A is willing to inflate its inflation. 
According to Mundell (1961:675), “Depreciation can take the place of unemployment 
when the external balance is in deficit, and appreciation can replace inflation when it is in 
surplus.” In other words, averting unemployment in country B can only occur when 
country A is willing to inflate its inflation. If country A chooses/country A and B choose 
to not inflate inflation, however, unemployment cannot be avoided in either country.   
 
The free mobility of factors of production, as suggested by Mundell (1961), can restore 
external equilibrium by reallocating unemployed inputs into areas that need them. The 
above example further illustrates that labour and capital will leave country B, where 
unemployment is high, and join the supply of labour and capital in country A, while 
wages in both countries remain constant. Unemployment and inflation vanish. Hence, the 
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adjustment problem between the two countries will disappear automatically if the factor 
mobility is sufficient. In this regard, the factor mobility will evoke sufficient 
equilibrating adjustment to demand shocks, and will help to minimise the costs of 
integration too.  
 
Mundell‟s argument for factor mobility justifies a fixed exchange rate system, because 
sufficient factor mobility weakens the need for a flexible exchange rate system (Mundell, 
1973). Furthermore, he suggests that factor mobility can serve as a better means of 
absorbing the impact of shocks when they occur. Consequently, the greater the factor 
mobility between countries intending to participate in a common currency area, the easier 
it is to form a common currency area. In short, the gist of Mundell‟s argument is that the 
factor mobility between countries weakens the need for exchange rates, and countries 
whose factor mobility is stable are suitable to join a common currency area.  
 
On the other hand, when there is factor immobility between the countries, each country 
should keep a separate currency. Corden (1973) counters Mundell‟s argument that labour 
mobility is an important variable in adjusting to asymmetric shocks. Corden (1973:168) 
argues: 
 
Can it really be imagined that a U.K. depressed-area problem could be 
solved by the large- scale migration of British workers to Germany? It is a 
conceivable; but when Britons are reluctant even to move from Scotland or 
Tyneside to the South, though the language is almost the same, it takes 
some imagination to conceive of labor mobility solving the central problem 
of monetary integration. 
 
This position was further supported by Mongelli (2002), who noted that differences in 
labour market institutions could lead to divergent developments in terms of wages and 
prices even in the presence of similar shocks. There have been numerous studies on 
factor mobility, particularly labour mobility, as a possible adjustment mechanism. 
Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) examined the degree of labour market integration for the 
United States (US) and European Union (EU) and found that inter-regional labour 
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mobility appears to be a more positive adjustment mechanism in the US, which has a 
more integrated labour market than the EU. Generally, one can conclude that even the 
EU does not meet the labour mobility criterion of OCA theory due to cultural and 
linguistic differences. However, Mundell‟s argument survives, despite the valid 
criticisms, as one of the criteria for ensuring an optimal currency area.  
 
2.2.1.2  Degree of economic openness (McKinnon, 1963) 
McKinnon (1963:717) raises the degree of openness, defined as the ratio of tradables to 
non-tradables, as a crucial criterion of optimising a currency union. According to 
McKinnon (1963), the more countries participated in integrated trade, and the more open 
their economies become, and the more suitable they are to forming a currency area. In 
other words, countries whose economies are open to world trade are more suitable for 
participating in a common currency as the flexible exchange rate system becomes less 
efficiently and effectively. He argues that the more open an economy is, the greater the 
need for fixed exchange rates to avert any price instability caused by exchange rate 
variations. McKinnon (1963:719) notes that, “If we move across the spectrum from 
closed to open economies, flexible exchange rates become both less effective as a control 
device for external balance and more damaging to internal price level stability.” Open 
economies can absorb shocks and, thus, countries with open economies may find it 
beneficial to join a common currency area. 
 
McKinnon (1963) favours a fixed exchange rate regime in open economies; he argues 
that the probability of money illusion is lowest in highly open economies. According to 
McKinnon (1963), the absence of money illusion makes a flexible exchange rate system 
incapable of performing its stabilising function. Furthermore, any exchange rate variation 
in a highly open economy has no impact on the terms of trade and real wages, because 
the fluctuation in the price of the currency will affect both the export price of domestic 
goods and the import price of foreign goods. Therefore, when an open economy employs 
a flexible exchange rate system to correct external deficit, it is likely to experience 
21 
 
greater internal price instability (Ishiyama, 1975:83). The more open economies are to 
foreign demand for and supply of goods, the less severe the variation is in external 
shocks; and the exchange rate also becomes less effective in correcting external deficits 
(McKinnon, 1963). In an open economy, wages and domestic prices quickly moderate 
the fluctuations in the exchange rate and render the necessary adjustment.  
 
2.2.1.3  Product diversification (Kenen, 1969) 
Kenen (1969) suggests product diversification as a crucial criterion in determining 
optimality of a currency area. He argues that in well-diversified economies (where there 
is high product diversification), group countries would be better able to sustain an 
optimum currency area than those with economies that are not well diversified; hence, 
the former countries can establish a currency area. The main argument is that larger 
production variety dissipates negative terms of trade shocks and brings about automatic 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks, so the need for exchange rate adjustment would simply 
be less necessary, or non-existent.  
 
For example, in a country that produces limited product types and exports only a few, a 
reduction in export revenue would result in a relatively higher idle capacity (a higher rate 
of unemployed labour) than in a more diversified economy with a fixed exchange rate 
(Kenen, 1969:49). This argument implies that in well-diversified economies, asymmetric 
shocks would be less significant than in less diversified economies. Kenen (1969:49) 
argues:  
 
A country that engages in a number of activities is also apt to export a wide 
range of products. Each individual export may be subject to disturbances, 
whether due to changes in external demand or technology. But if those 
disturbances are independent consequent on variations in the composition 
of expenditure or output, rather than massive macroeconomic swings 
affecting the entire export array, the law of large numbers will come into 
play. At any point in time, a country can expect to suffer significant 
reversals in export performance, but also enjoy significant successes […] 
From the standpoint of external balance, taken by itself, economic 
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diversifications, reflected in export diversification, serves, ex ante, to 
forestall the need for frequent changes in the terms of trade and therefore, 
for frequent changes in national exchange rates. 
 
The higher the degree of diversity of the productive structure of economies, the better 
insulated the economy, it is against a variety of shocks and obviating the necessity of 
making frequent changes to the terms of trade through exchange rate manipulation, as 
suggested by Kenen (1969). As a result, fixed exchange rates are most appropriate – or 
the least inappropriate – for well-diversified economies. The fundamental point of this 
argument, which Presley and Dennis (1976:24) highlight, is that “positive changes with 
respect to some exports will be offset by negative changes with respect to others; as 
demand for some increases, the demand for others falls”. The more diversified export 
products are, the greater this offsetting mechanism will be. In other words, a country with 
a less-diversified production structure should keep a floating regime and it benefits from 
a floating exchange rate system as it may help the economy to achieve efficient 
allocation of resources.  
 
Furthermore, Rwakunda (2004:19) argues that having a variety of export products 
influences the balance of payment and so, ceteris paribus, increases pressures on the 
exchange rates; a country with high product diversification will have a lesser need for 
exchange rate changes, whilst the contrary holds for a country with low diversification of 
export products. Consequently, countries intending to join a currency area must take into 
account the diversity of the productive structure of their own and other countries‟ 
economies, as this is a key factor in determining whether a currency union is feasible. 
Moreover, the diversity of the export production structure affects terms of trade, thus the 
speed and ease business cycles adjustment, which obviates the need to use the exchange 
rate. Therefore, according to Kenen (1969), highly diversified economies are better 
candidates for currency areas than less-diversified economies. The more diversified the 





2.2.1.4  Similarity in rates of inflation 
Haberler (1970) and Fleming (1971) considered the similarity in rates of inflation as an 
important criterion in establishing an optimum currency area. This criterion focuses on 
the macroeconomic phenomena. The main argument is that “the payments imbalance is 
most likely to be the outcome of divergent trends in national inflation rates due to 
structural developments, differences in trade unions‟ aggressiveness or differences in 
national monetary policies” (Ishiyama, 1975:88). However, when the rate of inflation is 
identical, there will be no effect on the terms of trade and, ceteris paribus, an equilibrated 
flow of a current account will take place within the currency area.  
 
Fleming (1971:476) points out that when inflation rates between partner countries are 
similar over time, terms of trade will remain fairly stable and the countries would benefit 
from shifting to a common currency. This implies that countries that intend to form a 
common currency ought to have relatively similar inflation rates in order to make it 
easier to adjust to the same kinds of shocks. In addition, similar in inflation rates among 
member countries of a intending to participate in a common currency area enhance 
business cycle synchronisation and cause less macroeconomic volatility in those 
countries.  
 
Furthermore, if countries have different historical rates of inflation, converging inflation 
rates can be difficult. Conversely, countries with the same historical inflation rates can 
accomplish convergence relatively easily. The greater the similarity of countries‟ 
inflation rates, the more beneficial it is to form a common currency area. However, 
Talvas (1993:673) argues that a similarity in inflation rates is not a precondition of 
participating in a currency area. Countries that want to form a currency area should 
implement measures to achieve integrated inflation rates to make establishing a common 





2.2.1.5  Financial integration 
Scitovsky (1958) and Ingram (1973) considered financial integration as one of the crucial 
tenets for forming a currency union. Essentially, they argue that when there is a high 
degree of integration in the financial market of a domain, there will be less necessity for 
exchange rate variation (Ishiyama, 1975:87). Countries that experience seamless 
integration of their financial markets increase their propensity to form a currency union, 
as well as strengthen trade links. Furthermore, financial integration can also forestall 
financial crises and market instability, and the participating countries will equitably 
absorb the costs of shocks.  
 
Rwakunda (2004:20) argues that if there is a high degree of international financial 
integration, exchange rate variations will not be need to restore external equilibrium, 
since negligible changes in interest rates will give rise to efficient exchange rates within 
the area where financial integration exists. The greater the financial integration in partner 
countries, the more attractive it will be to establish a common currency area. 
 
2.2.1.6  Degree of policy integration 
Ingram (1969) and Haberler (1970) emphasise that good policy integration between 
countries is a crucial criterion for forming a currency area. Serious policy coordination 
among sovereign states, as Ishiyama (1975:90) asserts, requires a great deal of political 
will and determination, particularly when it comes to dealing with domestic issues.    
Ingram (1969: 98) argues:  
 
I do not think the optimum size of a currency area can be discovered by 
looking for real economic determinants of it, such as degree of labor 
mobility or homogeneity of output, although these factors may certainly 
affect the speed and ease of adjustment. I think the efficacy of a currency 
area depends on policy positions taken by governments and on the firmness 
of their commitment to them, on attitudes of the population toward the 
adjustment processes involved, on the nature of financial and other 
institutions, and on some economic considerations that are largely omitted 
from much present analysis. 
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Concurring with Ingram, Haberler (1970) asserts that it is not the characteristics of the 
economy, but the similarity of policies, which creates the requisite conditions for a 
flourishing currency area. Effective policy coordination is necessary to avoid tension, 
disagreements and fragmentation of the union. Fiscal-monetary policies must be 
harmoniously aligned to that the common currency is not established while there are 
wildly different sets of policies, as this could result in serious issues; for instance, a 
country might reduce its inflation and budget deficit.  
 
Kenen (1994) argues that having similar fiscal systems in a region may contribute to, 
offset or compensate for regional differences. It therefore requires that the members of 
the union be subjected to a common code of fiscal conduct to ensure smooth functioning 
of the union and share price stability. In addition, countries that agree to compensate or 
secure against contingent loss will be better candidates for an optimum currency area.  
The fiscal transfer can act as insurance to mitigate the costs of an asymmetric shock 
resulting from an adverse shock. This harmonisation of fiscal policy would consolidate 
and enhance the accruable benefits of a common currency area. Furthermore, policy 
integration can serve as a catalyst to facilitate coordination of partner countries‟ 
economic policies such that they surrender their fiscal-monetary policies to a 
supranational institution.  
 
Policy integration between potential members increases their ability to achieve 
macroeconomic convergence. Moreover, successful regional integration and/or 
cooperation should be based on a shared vision, homogeneity of preferences, 
consultation and joint actions. The fiscal policy and monetary policy of a currency area 
must coincide. The experiences of European Monetary Union (EMU) in the process of 
implementing European currency integration suggest that conflicting domestic interests 
may jeopardize the policy coordination needed for the sustainable operation of the 
exchange rate regime. The traditional approach is a useful lens through which to look at 
the issues of establishing a common currency area, but does not comprehensively cover 
the many facets involved (Ishiyama, 1975). The traditional view is preoccupied with the 
26 
 
choice of exchange rate regime, or the search for the characteristics that could define an 
OCA. Participating in regional economic integration (e.g. a monetary union) incurs both 
benefits and costs for the partner countries involved. The cost-benefit approach focuses 
on the costs and benefits of participating in a common currency area. The cost-benefit 
approach provides further insights and acknowledges the shortcomings of the 
mainstream traditional views.  
 
2.2.2 The cost-benefit approach (1970s to the present) 
The cost-benefit approach developed from the optimum currency area theory of the early 
1960s. This approach tries to evaluate the costs and benefits of participating in a currency 
area, from the perspective of the participating region/countries (Ishiyama, 1975:78). It 
has an analytical framework and results are applicable; it also acknowledges the biases 
and the asymmetric shocks among the partners in that particular domain. From the 
individual country‟s perspective, a common currency involves serious economic costs. 
Membership of a currency union imposes severe restraints on policy discretion and the 
possibility of losing seignorage. This makes participation in a currency area less 
attractive. Nonetheless, in terms of the progressiveness of a monetary union, several 
important benefits of a common currency can be enumerated.  
 
2.2.2.1  Benefits of a common currency 
A common currency area gives an opportunity to the individual states to create and adopt 
policies and institutions that focus on expanding their economic capacity in the long term 
and to make the adjustments essential for economic growth and industrial development. 
It is conceivable that the adoption of a single currency area could lead to numerous 
benefits and, hence, makes a currency area attractive. To put it differently, the theory of 
OCA promises numerous benefits of to those that join a single currency area. These 





2.2.2.1.1  The elimination of transaction costs 
The most visible and straightforwardly quantifiable benefit of participating in a common 
currency area is the elimination of the costs of exchanging one currency into another (De 
Grauwe, 2003:60). In other words, having a single currency eliminates the cost 
associated with converting one currency into another. The gains derived from the 
elimination of transaction costs can only be reaped when national currencies are 
substituted with a common currency (De Grauwe, 2003:60). Gerber (2005:234) argues 
that the elimination of deceptive price signals that lead to exchange rate fluctuations is 
also a potential gain in the currency area.  
 
Furthermore, a single currency area enhances transparency and builds the confidence of 
both consumers and firms. Within a single currency area, it would be easy, for instance, 
for a South African citizen to trade with or pay Botswanian citizen within the union. As 
freedom of economic transactions increases, it further fuels positive gains and augments 
the mobility of goods, services and factors of production. In this regard, a single currency 
area can create substantial trade and investment flows, and efficient resource allocation 
to member countries. In addition, it can reduce prices for products due to heightened 
competition, and promote efficacy of resource allocation within the union, thus increase 
trade among members of the community.  
 
According to De Grauwe (2003:61), the elimination of transaction costs also leads to an 
indirect benefit, in the form of a reduction or abolition of price discrimination across the 
currency area. The use of a single currency simplifies trade and saves costs on converting 
one currency into another, dispatching goods and other logistics that impede trade 
(Kwan, 1998). It also contributes to the elimination of exchange rate risks and the costs 
of currency hedging. This makes the market more transparent and increases competition, 
which will benefit the consumers and increase the volume of trade in goods and services. 
Rose (2000:17) asserts that, “Countries with the same currency trade over three times as 
much as countries with different currencies.” In addition, in a currency area, money 
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serves as a unit of account, which facilitates the comparison of wages and domestic 
product prices (Szebeni, 2004:13). 
 
2.2.2.1.2  Transparency of prices 
The adoption of a common currency leads to homogenisation of domestic prices within 
the area. It therefore becomes less expensive to transport goods and permits consumers 
and firms to easily compare prices as the prices are expressed in one currency (De 
Grauwe, 2003:63). In other words, a single currency eliminates major price differentials 
among the union members and consumers can compare prices of goods and services in 
the market. This makes consumers price conscious buyers and forces businesses to 
become more productive and efficient competitors. Duma (2000:6) argues that the 
opaqueness of goods and services‟ price caused by different currencies operating in a 
currency area will be eliminated and, as a result, trade will be promoted.  
 
Monopolies in a currency area will lose dominance due to the transparency of prices and 
the equalisation of factor prices.  (2006:13), this could lead and 
encourage participating countries‟ governments to adopt more market-oriented reforms. 
Trade and competition will be heightened in national markets, as prices in the area will 
be fully transparent and directly comparable. For example, in a single currency area, the 
firms that compete in the market will set the same prices for goods and services, as they 
will use the same currency with the same value.  
 
2.2.2.1.3  Elimination of uncertainty caused by exchange rate fluctuation 
The adoption of a common currency eliminates the foreign exchange rate uncertainties or 
risks across the currency area due to the disappearance of the exchange risk premium and 
non-currency considerations. A single currency area purges overshooting of the exchange 
rate within the area and promotes economic stability. As Duma (2000:5) notes, the 
exchange rate overshooting causes instability and insecurity, which may undermine the 
credibility of economy and currency. It is well known that economic uncertainty prevents 
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efficient co-operation and economic credibility to attract foreign investment. The 
elimination of exchange rate uncertainty will enable investors to make decision with 
some degree of long-term confidence, as a stable financial environment and the highest 
standards of financial responsibility and integrity will , 
2006:339). Emerson et al. (1992) advocate this point by arguing that a currency area is 
the only means of totally eliminating exchange rates uncertainty and transaction. They 
further point out that there is much evidence that a positive relationship exists between 
foreign direct investment and exchange rate stability.  
 
Hasin (2006) argues that a single currency area eliminates speculative capital flows 
among the participating countries and saves the members‟ exchange reserves for 
transaction within the area. Gerber (2005:234) posits that the elimination of exchange 
rates through the adoption of a single currency can increase political trust, and eliminate 
some problems caused by misalignment of the exchange rates. The elimination of 
currency risk and the harmonisation of market practices are likely to increase cross-
border investment, and thus, economic growth across the currency area. The exchange 
rate stability would further promote mutual trade in the area because the uncertainty 
associated with trade would be eliminated, making intra-union trade more similar to 
domestic trade (Jepma et al., 1996:359). Reduced risk (volatility) provides investors an 
impetus to make foreign direct investment and a favourable business environment across 
the currency area (De Grauwe, 2003:67). 
 
2.2.2.1.4  Other benefits of a common currency area 
Firstly, a common currency area can reinforce the credibility of macroeconomic policies, 
i.e. monetary and fiscal policies. An added benefit is that it can also protect the central 
banks from political pressures. Furthermore, it can assist in terms of ensuring that 
policies are better aligned to economic needs, and ensures that the costs of high inflation 




Secondly, through collaborative efforts within the union, it can promote joint 
development in all fields of economic activity and in financial infrastructure. It can also 
expand and create additional opportunities for less developed members, who will learn 
from the more advanced members, and thus bridge the development gap that exists 
between members. Furthermore, it lowers the cost of doing business with each other, 
creates a monumental potential market for investors and brings about the gradual 
removal of capital flow controls. It may further promote initiative, innovation and 
constant amelioration in the allocation of resources. This heightens competition and 
trade, which in turn can help in make the region a more attractive investment option. 
 
Thirdly, a common currency area can improve and strengthen collective bargaining, 
resulting in positive regional development. Furthermore, it can create broader economic 
synergies and political relationships, and cement domestic market-orientated reforms in a 
manner that propels economic and financial development (Jovanovic, 2006:13). 
Moreover, a currency union can contribute towards the improvement of participating 
member states‟ national welfare, and strengthen the functioning of a free market. Finally, 
according to Bayoumi (1994:552), a currency area can improve the welfare of regions 
within a domain.  
 
2.2.2.2  The costs of a common currency 
While the introduction of a common currency could create lucrative opportunities and 
gains, it could also become a source of challenges and costs. This is simply because the 
member countries lose complete autonomy over their domestic policies to a common 
central bank‟s approval. According to Gerber (2005:347), participating in a common 
currency area implies a “one size fits all” policy, and leads participating countries to 
relinquish instruments of economic policy such as monetary policy. The costs of 
participating in a common currency area encompassed in the requisite macroeconomic 




2.2.2.2.1  Loss of autonomy over monetary policy 
The main cost of participating in a currency area is the country‟s loss of national control 
over their monetary policy as a stabilising instrument of adjustment in their economy 
(Gerber, 2005:326). By belonging to a currency area, the individual country foregoes 
some sovereignty in regulating its monetary-fiscal policies in conformity with the 
prevalent economic conditions (Kwan, 1998). In other words, the adoption of a common 
currency means that the union members must give up their own national monetary 
policies and accept whatever contractionary or expansionary policy the supranational 
central bank chooses (Duma, 2000:7). According to De Grauwe (2003:5), a country that 
belongs to a common currency area cannot determine the volume of its national money 
circulation, or even change the short-term interest rate. 
 
2.2.2.2.2  Loss of autonomy over exchange rate policy 
Losing sovereignty over one‟s national exchange rate policy is perceived as a major cost 
of participating in a currency area. Joining a monetary union means that the member 
country must also relinquish its national control over its exchange rate policy. According 
to De Grauwe (2003:37), participation in a monetary union means that a member country 
is not able to independently revalue or devalue, and even control, the quantity of money 
circulating in the economy. The exchange rate policy in a monetary union cannot be used 
as an adjustment mechanism to offset demand and supply shocks in the economy (Duma, 
2000:7). Jenkins and Thomas (1997:5) argue that members‟ loss of control over their 
exchange rate policy increases the fiscal burden of countries with high inflation by 
diminishing revenue if disinflation is necessary. That loss will be more costly when 
macroeconomic shocks are more asymmetric.  
 
2.2.2.2.3  Loss of seigniorage 
The loss of seigniorage can be another cost associated with participating in a currency 
area. It is also known as inflation tax. National governments lose their ability to raise 
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revenues through inflationary finance when they are using or, participating in a common 
currency area (Zestos, 2006:348). Seigniorage comes from the national currency held 
abroad. For instance, a government may print more money to raise revenue in order to 
cover its budget deficit instead of selling debts. Seigniorage in some countries is a major 
source of government revenue in economies with high inflation, as governments finance 
their deficits by creating more money. In a currency area, according to Jovanovic 
(2006:337), it is not possible for a country to inflate its way out of an economic crisis 
and, as a result, a country in crises should trim down its debts and/or sell more reserves.  
 
Duma (2000:7) argues that, “[t]he ability of an economy to earn seigniorage is lost in a 
monetary union since the economy cannot independently manipulate fiscal and monetary 
policy.” Furthermore, member countries‟ involvement in a monetary leads to loss of 
seigniorage revenue through banknotes issuance and the use of seigniorage to finance the 
budget deficit and other projects. According to Emerson et al. (1992:120), however, 
seigniorage is not an important cost since it usually contributes less than 1 % of the gross 
domestic product (GDP).  
 
2.2.2.2.4  Changeover costs 
A country intending to participate in a single currency area has to accept there are 
changeover costs associated with switching to a new currency. In a common currency 
are, a new bills and coins have to be minted and old ones have to be removed from 
circulation. Furthermore, businesses have to convert their selling prices and wages into a 
new currency (Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1997). These changeover costs include 
administrative functions, technical printing, vending machines and distribution of new 
currency within the area (Jovanovic, 2006:337). The OCA theory recommends that a 
fixed exchange rate system be used if the benefits thereof outweigh the costs, from the 
view-point of national-self-interest and welfare (Ishiyama, 1975:79). Appendix B 




2.3  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the OCA theory, and subsequent modifications, forms the intellectual 
foundation of any discussion on currency unions. The traditional approach focuses on 
identifying specific ideal economic characteristics most relevant to choosing potential 
participants in a currency area. It presents a range of economic conditions that countries 
need in order to benefit from joining a currency area, including factor mobility; having 
an open economy with a diversified production structure; and symmetry with potential 
partners‟ domestic business cycles. Contrary to the traditional approach, the cost-benefit 
approach concentrates on the potential benefits and costs of participating in a currency 
union. The former arise from the elimination of the deadweight loss associated with 
multiple currencies and the latter arise from the loss of independence over 
macroeconomic policies (Ishiyama, 1975:83).  
 
It should be noted that a monetary union does not depend entirely upon economic 
factors; it also depends on political will of member countries intending to establish a 
currency area (Frankel & Rose, 1996). Without political willingness and effective 
management of the implementation process by member states, establishing a common 
currency will not succeed, irrespective of having other key factors in place. The success 
of such initiatives requires leaders who think beyond the short-term gains and consider 
the long-term benefits of regional cooperation. A detailed analysis of the OCA theory is 
included in the works of Ishiyama (1975), Kwai (1987), Talvas (1993) and Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997), among others. Given the above theoretical foundations of optimum 











EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical literature on optimum currency areas. 
Much of the analysis of the benefits and costs of a monetary union is based on the theory 
of optimum currency areas. However, whether establishing a monetary union can lead to 
net trade creation (or diversion) needs to be taken for analysed methodically. This 
chapter presents selective empirical evidence on optimum currency areas. As such, it has 
drawn some lessons from the global experience of monetary integration, and it makes 
specific reference to the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the CFA Franc zone. 
 
3.2  A selective review of the empirical literature 
A number of empirical studies assess the effects of currency areas, the optimal potential 
and/or actual currency areas. These include the work of Grandes (2004), Jenkins and 
Thomas (1997), Rose (2000), Tjirongo (1995), Bayoumi (1994), Matsaseng (2008), 
Edwards and Magendzo (2003), Jonung and Sjoholm (1998), Frankel and Rose (2002), 
Zhao and Kim (2009), Nielsen et al. (2005), Mkenda (2001), and Shirono (2007), among 
others. These studies are briefly reviewed below.  
 
A study by Rose (2000) investigated the effects of a currency union on trade; it used a 
treatment regression analysis and found that trade is tripled in countries that share a 
common currency. Frankel and Rose (2002) performed panel data studies of the common 
currency effects on trade and concluded that adopting a currency union leads to an 
increase in trade. Moreover, the authors argued that trade induced by a currency union 
might beneficially affect income. Rose and Stanley (2005) conducted a quantitative 
survey and found that a currency union increases trade by between 30% and 90%. 
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Edwards and Magendzo (2003) studied inflation, output growth and output volatility of 
currency union countries, and concluded that currency union members have lower 
inflation and higher output volatility than countries with their own currencies.  
 
Using a general equilibrium model to evaluate the impact of currency unions, Bayoumi 
(1994) found that a currency union can raise the welfare of the regions within the area, 
while it lowering the welfare of those outside the union. In another study, Shirono (2007) 
used a micro-founded gravity model to investigate trade-creating effects and welfare 
gains linked with a common currency arrangement in East Asia. He found that an East 
Asian currency union substantially increases bilateral flows among the members; 
however, the welfare effects are minimal. On the other hand, he found that if Japan, a 
major trade partner in East Asia, is included in the union, the welfare effects increase 
substantially.   
 
Tjirongo (1995) used the theory of optimum currency areas as a framework to evaluate 
Namibia‟s suitability as a member of the CMA, examined the costs and benefits of 
joining the CMA and the instruments that can be used to address asymmetric shocks in 
the region. He concluded that, given the relative size of the Namibian economy versus 
South Africa‟s, the degree of openness to international trade and the high degree of 
capital mobility, the use of the nominal exchange rate instrument would have limited 
effects on asymmetric shocks and thus, it would be beneficial for Namibia to join the 
CMA arrangement.  
 
Grandes (2004) studied the ongoing monetary integration in Southern Africa and whether 
the CMA has been optimal currency area, as well as the costs and benefits of 
participating in the CMA. Using the generalised purchasing power parity (G-PPP) 
modelling technique to investigate these issues, he concluded that the CMA group, with 
Botswana as a de facto member, forms an OCA. Mkenda (2001) used the theory of 
optimum currency areas (OCAs), together with the generalised purchasing power parity 
(G-PPP) model, to assess whether the East African Community (EAC) of forming a 
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monetary union. He found that the G-PPP method supports the formation of a currency 
union in the region. Zhao and Kim (2009) examined the characteristics of the CFA Franc 
zone and compared them to those of the EMU by operationalising the criteria for an 
optimum currency area. They found that the CFA Franc zone countries are structurally 
different and thus are more likely to be subject to asymmetric shocks, and a monetary 
union may be a costly arrangement for the member countries unless they are 
compensated with other significant benefits. Eichengreen and Rose (1998) have analyzed 
the correlation of pursuing a certain exchange rate regime to financial fragility. They find 
varying linkages between the type of exchange rate regime and the likelihood of a 
financial crisis. Similarly, Dormac and Peria (2000), using an empirical analysis, they 
find that adoption of a fixed exchange rates reduces considerably the probability of a 
banking crisis happening to inflict damage in the economy. 
 
3.3  The global experience of monetary integration: The EMU 
There has been a wide range of monetary integration initiatives around the world. The 
most familiar monetary integration project is that of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). The success of the EMU forming the European currency has inspired many 
regions to consider launching their own currencies (Zhao & Kim, 2009:1877). The 
Delors Report (1989) and the Maastricht Treaty (1991) provide much insight into the 
establishment of the EMU. The Delors Report laid out the context in which the monetary 
union could evolve, while the Maastricht Treaty officially endorsed the Delors Report 
and called for the formation of EMU. In 2002, a fully-fledged European Monetary Union 
(EMU) emerged with a single currency, known as the Euro (Giovannini, 1995). 
 
Despite the stresses and challenges of establishing the European monetary system, it 
functioned much better than many observers had expected. It is hard, however, to argue 
that the EMU satisfies the requirements of an optimal currency area to any appreciable 
extent. In fact, Jovanovic (2006:332) argues that the EMU does not satisfy the OCA 
criteria. The EMU, which has thus far been a plausible model for monetary integration, 
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had a low correlation of shocks and labour and capital mobility were relatively scarce 
among its members in the pre-union period (Ricci, 1997:7). As pointed out by Frankel 
and Rose (1998), currency areas that do not resemble currency unions ex ante may do so 
ex post. The economic impact of the EMU on member countries includes the elimination 
of transaction costs and foreign exchange risk, and it achieves price stability through the 
set-up of an independent central bank (Giovannini, 1995:164). The detailed review of the 
EMU is beyond the scope of this study. However, certain lessons can be drawn from the 
EMU‟s success to assist SACU in establishing firmer integration or a currency area.  
  
3.4  Lessons from the EMU community 
The EMU is a very expedient case for SACU and its members to follow. First and 
foremost, political willpower and commitment played a pivotal role in the formation of 
the EMU and engendered the successful launch of a single currency, the Euro. As 
Rutledge (2008:125) argues, the formation of the EMU was not exclusively driven by 
economic merits per se, but also by political will, which had a major influence on its 
realisation. Such strong political will and unity on issues around the formation of the 
European monetary union were able to override the fact that the EMU, in many 
instances, is not a model optimum currency area. Some commentators have propounded 
the view that the EMU was instituted before satisfying the strict requisite conditions 
(Yeh, 2008:248). However, political will and a great sense of community, certainly, are 
indispensable. This is imperative to SACU‟s success and progress. Masson and Pattillo 
(2005) argue that the EU countries have shown considerable political will and 
commitment to sustaining an integrated goods and financial market.  
 
Secondly, the experience of the EMU clearly indicates that to establish a viable monetary 
union, it requires alignment of economies and policies, and having a common central 
bank to monitor and regulate economic policies. The economic survelliant must be 
vested with the authority to sanction countries that do not comply with the protocols 
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(Feldstein, 1997). All EMU members have had a say in the formulation of European 
monetary-fiscal policies.  
 
Thirdly, the European experience shows that regional integration is likely to thrive if one 
country serves as a leader. However, the success of the EMU was mainly enforced by 
two economic superpowers: Germany and France were willing to provide leadership. In 
the context of SACU, one can argue that it is possible to establish a currency area in 
which the South African Rand is the central currency. South Africa has a strong economy 
and a central bank with a good track record of currency stability, as it strictly monitors 
inflation via inflation-targeting policies. As a result, South Africa‟s central bank could 
act as the nucleus bank for the region.  
 
Interesting questions in this regard are: Will Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
(BLNS) accept South Africa in this role? Moreover, will South Africa be willing to take 
on this role? One cannot confidently answer these questions, as the drive for regional 
integration in the SACU region is sometimes overshadowed by members‟ concerns about 
their national interests. This is evident in the recent incident where Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, while 
Namibia and South Africa did not sign the agreement. South Africa and Namibia did not 
sign the agreement because they felt that the agreement will negatively impact on their 
economies since it does not address all issues of their concern.  
 
Fourthly, according to Article 31 (3) of the 2002 SACU Agreement: “No member state 
shall negotiate and enter into new preferential trade agreements with third parties or 
amend existing agreements without the consent of other Member States” (SACU, 2007). 
The provision of the agreement binds members to negotiate and conclude negotiations as 
a group. This shows that the members of a 100-year-old customs union still lack the 
political commitment to unity and come up with one solid voice.  Fourthly, the success of 
a monetary union lies with all stakeholders. The success of the EMU can be attributed to 
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the fact that it was supported by multi-stakeholder constituency comprising corporate 
groups, government and non-governmental organisations (Feldstein, 1997). 
 
3.5  The African experience of a monetary union: The CFA Franc zone 
Despite all the setbacks to economic integration in Africa, the CFA Franc zone and the 
CMA group testify to the success of monetary integration in Africa. The CFA Franc zone 
is an existing currency union in Africa; formed in 1945, it consists of two sub-zones 
(WAEMU and CEMAC) and has 14 member countries (Zhao & Kim, 2009). Rutledge 
(2008:132) argues that the CFA Franc zone has existed for over half century and has a 
large number of member of members no due to economic considerations, but because it 
was driven by the political legacy of French colonial rule. The CFA Franc zone 
represents a classic full monetary union, with a common currency, the CFA Franc 
(Hadjimichael & Galy, 1997).  
 
Members enjoy the free transfer of funds within the CFA Franc zone; common rules 
apply to countries outside the union; there is a common banking and monetary policy; 
there are uniform interest rates as well as a credit policy (Aziakpono, 2008:190). 
Interestingly, according to Hadjimichael and Galy (1997:33), the CFA Franc zone is a 
“monetary union with a fixed exchange rate, and the anchor currency country, France, 
guarantees the convertibility of the CFA Franc into French francs”. Some commentators 
argue that the CFA region is a political project that is not driven by efficiency 
considerations. Kawai and Takagi (2005:104) posit that, the CFA Franc zone is not 
regarded as an optimum currency area due to its poor integration.  
 
Masson (2005:47) argues that, “without France‟s active encouragement of its former 
colonies to remain in the CFA Franc zone […] it is likely that the monetary unions […] 
would have been dissolved”. In the CFA Franc region, France leads the monetary 
cooperation. Although, according to Kawai and Takagi (2005:102), over the past decade, 
France‟s influence waned and market mechanisms have gained importance in monetary 
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policy-making and management. The CFA currency has been entrusted to a common 
central bank (comprising BCEAO and BEAC). A detailed review of the CFA Franc zone 
is beyond the scope of this study. However, certain lessons can be drawn from the CFA 
Franc zone‟s success to assist SACU in establishing better integration or a currency area.  
  
3.6  Lessons from the CFA Franc Zone 
Firstly, the CFA region shows that having ideal economic conditions is not the only way 
to achieve and strengthen regional economic integration; despite the limited trade 
linkages between the CFA countries, their political commitment and great sense of 
community has been instrumental in achieving monetary cooperation. Secondly, the 
experience of the CFA regions shows once again that one country must assume a 
leadership role. France has played a key role and has encouraged the CFA members to 
remain in the CFA Franc zone. Lastly, the CFA regions‟ experience indicates the 
importance of ensuring adequate autonomy and decision-making powers in the formation 
of a strong supranational institution. The absence of such a supranational institution 
makes it hard for member states to move toward the successful formation of a monetary 
union. 
 
Some salient features of a successful regional arrangement are suggested by a brief 
review of the EMU and CFA region. Instrumental to both the EMU and CFA region has 
been the frequent consultations, participative processes, and member countries‟ 
transference of a significant share of their national sovereignty to the respective 
supranational body (Mongelli, 2002). Their experiences in economic integration suggest 
that effective monetary cooperation should encompass: (i) economic surveillance 
mechanism; (ii) a regional financing facility; (iii) exchange rate coordination; and (v) a 
single currency (Mongelli, 2002). As a modality of regional monetary cooperation for 
SACU, the EMU and CFA Franc zone are likely to be a useful guide. From these lessons, 
SACU should implement three progressive steps: (i) participative policy-making and 
economic surveillance; (ii) a regional financing arrangement; and (iii) a keen desire and 
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commitment to its success and deeper integration. SACU has to adapt and evolve to stay 
relevant. However, there has to be a fundamental mindset change among SACU 
countries if they are to exploit global trade for their own growth rather than be exploited 
by global trade. SACU countries have to adopt a spirit of imitation, learn by doing, and 
renewed impetus towards economic diversification to foster their integration into the 
world economy.  
 
3.7  Conclusion 
In conclusion, a review of the selected empirical studies shows mixed results. Some 
studies have indicated that the monetary union double trade (Rose, 2000; Frankel & 
Rose, 2002); others show that the monetary union does not improve trade (Jonung & 
Sjoholm, 1998; Tjirongo, 1995). It is important to note that the economic prerequisite for 
the formation of OCA cannot solely engender the successful formation of a monetary 
union. As Rutledge (2008:125) posits, political will and institutional integration have an 
important role to play in accomplishing and deepening the process of regional economic 
integration. The experiences and success of the EMU and the CFA zone demonstrate that 
a monetary union is highly dependent on political will and commitment to ensuring 
integration. Furthermore, support from a multi-stakeholder constituency (i.e. corporate 
groups, government, and non-governmental organizations) is essential for regional 
integration in member countries. Hence, SACU member states can use the experiences of 
the EMU and the CFA region as a blueprint in its bid for a currency (or deeper 










THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION (SACU) 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
Regional economic integration has been attempted across the world, at various levels – 
for instance, using tariff reductions and various other integration methods – as a means of 
securing access to the world market and bargaining power, and as an important strategic 
move to reinforce growth in order to overcome developmental challenges (Jovanovic, 
2006). Manifestly, the formation of these regional economic groupings was expected to 
provide, among other things, each member country with better access to others‟ markets 
and technology, lower transaction costs, labour and human capital and economies of 
scale that do not occur in small markets limited by trade barriers. However, in many 
respects, there was little progress in these areas, especially in the African continent 
(African Development Report, 2000:177).  
 
African states have also identified regional economic integration as an important 
strategic imperative for promoting economic and export-oriented growth and sustainable 
development. Makhan (2002) argues that the regionalism in Africa is fundamentally a 
development strategy that incorporates the objective of diversifying the productive base 
of African countries in order to increase trade and export at regional level and as a means 
of integrating into a global economy. Regional economic integration in Africa is not in 
its infancy (Davies, 1994:1), and SACU, despite its challenges and conflicts, is regarded 
as the most effective and functional customs union in Africa. This chapter discusses the 






4.2  History of the formation and development of SACU 
SACU has a rich history and is the oldest operating customs union in the world. The 
members of SACU have developed positive relationships since its inception in 1910, 
both on the political and commercial fronts (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). To recap, 
SACU‟s member countries include Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland. Members of SACU have successfully sustained a spirit of cooperation over a 
century. In 1969, SACU agreement of 1910 was converted into an official customs union 
agreement (Venter & Neuland, 2007). SACU was established because meaningful trade 
and market cooperation, market liberalisation (the removal of trade barriers), economic 
growth and development and monetary cooperation were necessary (Hentz, 2005:1). 
After its inception, SACU signed a treaty to abolish all import duties imposed on its 
members and it current imposes a common external tariff (CET) on all other countries 
(Adedeji, 2004:201). The 1969 agreement has remained pivotal to SACU member states 
and this agreement was only amended in 2002. 
 
SACU has done much to ensure economic integration amongst its members, chiefly by 
achieving its customs union status. There is a free flow of goods between member 
countries and a common external tariff is applied. The aim of SACU‟s integration 
initiatives, past and present, is to stimulate regional economic flows between its members 
and to foster development for the whole area, particularly for the less advanced member 
countries, and monetary cooperation (Hentz, 2005:1). Oyejide (2000:8) argues that, of 
Africa‟s attempts at regional integration, SACU has had the most consistent success, as it 
has a long history of intra-regional trade between member states.  
 
However, it is apparent that the trade patterns in SACU tend to favour the regional 
superpower, South Africa. According to the African Development Report (1993), SACU 
and the Common Monetary Area (CMA) are good examples of successful regional 
integration schemes in Africa and serve as a reminder that sub-regional arrangements that 
combine mutually supportive trade and monetary cooperation have positive ramifications 
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for advancing economic integration. There is huge potential for SACU to move beyond 
its customs union structure to become either a common market or a monetary union. The 
latter may be one way in which cohesive economic integration could be strengthened in 
the region. Arguably the most effective economic organisation in Africa, according to 
Hansohm and Adongo (2006), SACU cannot overlook the possibility of creating a 
monetary union. 
 
4.2.1 The 1969 SACU Agreement and its objectives 
The 1910 agreement was officially converted into a Southern African Customs Union 
agreement in 1969. The main aim of this agreement was to maintain and facilitate the 
free interchange of goods among the member countries (Steenekamp, 2007: 236). The 
1969 agreement describes the objective of SACU as:  
 
Maintaining the free interchange of goods between (member) countries and 
applying the same tariffs and trade regulations to goods imported from 
outside the common customs area […] on a basis designed to ensure the 
continued economic development of the customs union area as a whole, and 
to ensure in particular that these arrangements encourage the development 
of the less advanced members of the customs union and diversification of 
their economies, and afford all parties equitable benefits arising from trade 
among themselves and with other countries (Davies, 1994:1).  
 
It also provided for a common external tariff and excise tariff for the common customs 
union and all customs and excise duties collected from the common customs area were 
paid into South Africa‟s national revenue fund and shared among members according to 
the prevailing revenue-sharing formula (Leevashni, 2007). Several scholars among, them 
McCarthy (1999b), have argued that this agreement was based on a dispensation 
managed unilaterally by South Africa and, thus, the other members of SACU were not 
happy and satisfied, and called for renegotiation of this agreement in order to 




4.2.2 The 2002 SACU Agreement and its objectives 
After 1994, members of SACU concurred that the 1969 agreement should be reviewed in 
order to more effectively address SACU member countries‟ needs in terms of the 
revenue-sharing formula and the decision-making processes of the customs union. The 
new agreement was signed in 2002 and came into effect in 2004. The 1969 agreement 
had remained a fundamental treaty among members, and the 2002 agreement had passed 
as the amendments of the original agreement (SACU, 2007).  
 
According to Hansohm and Adongo (2006:4), SACU is now closer to being a “true” 
regional integration (RI) scheme because it no longer allows South Africa to unilaterally 
manage its activities and it is an independent institution with equal partners. The new 
agreement underscores SACU‟s resurgence with a strong commitment to economic 
development and democratisation, and relatively more equitably distributed costs and 
benefits. It also encourages member countries‟ to better align with its policy coordination 
and trade strategies. The new agreement presents a radical shift in the management of 
SACU; its stated objectives include:   
 
 To facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of the 
Member States. 
 To create effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure 
equitable trade benefits to Member States.  
 To promote fair competition, substantially increase investment opportunities in the 
Common Customs Area. 
 To enhance the economic development, diversification, industrialisation and 
competitiveness of Member States. 
 To promote the integration of Member States into the global economy through 
enhanced trade and investment. 
 To facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs, excise and 
additional duties levied by Member States; and 
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 To facilitate the development of common policies and strategies (SACU, 2007). 
 
The fact that member countries may not enter into new preferential trade agreements 
with third parties without the other members‟ consent (SACU, 2007) is important t for 
two main reasons. First, it gives preference to a multilateral framework agreement(s). 
Second, it implicitly compels members to commit to the customs union‟s goals. 
Members of SACU have also established a compensation formula to mitigate the 
negative effects that a customs union might have on the less developed members (Hentz, 
2005:1). Furthermore, the new agreement encourages the member countries to develop 
common policies, such as industrial, agricultural, competition and intellectual property 
policies, as this will ensure the coordinated development of SACU policies (Draper et al., 
2007). Hence, SACU members have started work on the development of a common 
industrial policy, competition policy and agricultural policy.  
 
Venter and Neuland (2007:11) note, successful regional integration has to be guided by 
principles that foster harmonisation of sub-regional and national polices for programmes 
to be compatible and mutually reinforcing. Moreover, the 2002 SACU Agreement 
addresses members‟ prior concerns and balances the interests of all of its members. Its 
revamped policies and new institutions are based on democratic processes and have 
addressed inequality by using a new revenue-sharing formula (Hansohm & Adongo, 
2006). In principle, the new agreement can be considered a success as it normalises trade 
relations between members, and provides for the creation of a number of democratic 
institutions and joint decision making.   
 
4.2.3 The SACU revenue-sharing formula 
The new agreement encompasses a compensatory formula to mitigate the customs 
union‟s potentially negative effects on less developed members (Hentz, 2005:1). A 
common external tariff under SACU guarantees the free movement of goods and 
represents a significant source of revenue for less developed members, namely, Lesotho, 
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Swaziland and Namibia. Table 4.1 and 4.2 show that under the old and new SACU 
revenue-sharing arrangements, the BLNS members have received a large proportion of 
total government revenue from this source, and there is a substantial amount of implicit 
redistribution of fiscal revenues from South Africa to the BLNS. South Africa, which 
accounts for over 90 % of SACU‟s GDP, receives slightly more than half of the total 
revenue pool, and the revenue share of the BLNS far exceed their shares of SACU 
economic activity. According to Manuel (2007:1), SACU revenues from intra-trade have 
increased enormously from 1995, when they were at 3.2 billion, to the 23.1 billion 
recorded in 2005. 
 













SACU Payment  
(R million) 
2,622 1,438 2,641 9,897 1,503 
% of Revenue Pool 14,5 7,9 14,6 54,7 8,3 
% of Total Gov’t. 
Rev.(Excl. Grants) 
12,8 51,0 30,4 3,9 54,1 
Source: Flatters and Stern (2005) 
 














 (R million) 
4,008 1,984 3,228 13,027 2,795 
% of Revenue Pool 16,0 7,9 12,9 52,0 11,2 
% of Total Gov’t. 
Rev.(Excl. Grants) 
12,1 48,6 25,1 3,4 68,5 
Source: Flatters and Stern (2005) 
 
As can be seen from the above tables, almost all of the implicit redistribution from South 
Africa to the BLNS under the new formula arises from the sharing of customs revenues. 
This is because the new formula allocates customs revenues, not on the basis of each 
member‟s imports of dutiable products, but rather in proportion to their share of intra-
SACU trade and South Africa depends on the BLNS for only a very small share of its 
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imports. The 2005 estimates indicate that SACU payments accounted for 49% of 
government revenue in Lesotho, 69% in Swaziland, 25% in Namibia, 12% in Botswana, 
and 3% in South Africa (Flatters & Stern, 2005:2).  
 
The new SACU agreement has made substantial changes to this revenue-sharing 
arrangement and the revenue share accruing to each member is now calculated with three 
basic components: a share of the customs pool; a share of the excise pool; and a share of 
the development budget. The present formula distributes customs and excise revenue on 
the basis of forecasts of reconciled against actual collections and intra-trade data.  A 
more precise image of the importance of these shares is provided in Figure 4.1, which 
shows the composition of SACU payments by component under the new revenue share 
formula.  
 






















Source: Flatters and Stern (2005)  
 
The new SACU agreement has affected the revenue sharing arrangements between members. As 
illustrated in the above Figure 4.1, it is instructive to note that South Africa, the dominant 
partner accounting for over 90% of SACU GDP and over 80% of SACU‟s total imports, 
receives the majority (about 80 percent) of its SACU revenue through the excise 
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component whilst the remaining BLNS members each receive most of their revenue from 
the customs component. The BLNS countries are therefore extremely vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the level of customs collections.  
 
4.2.4 The SACU institutional structure and arrangements 
The New Agreement has been perceived more comprehensive than the old Agreement. It 
provides an establishment of an independent full-time administrative secretariat to 
manage all SACU affairs (Kirk & Stern, 2003). Members of SACU meet annually to 
discuss all matters related to the Customs Union Agreement. The organisational structure 
of SACU comprises: 
 
 The Council of Ministers: A body represented by one minister from each SACU 
member country. It is the supreme SACU decision-making body. 
 The Commission: An administrative body comprised of senior officials, three 
technical liaison committees and an established agricultural liaison committee.  
 The Tribunal: An independent body of experts, that reports directly to the council of 
ministers. The tribunal is responsible for tariff setting and the anti-dumping 
mechanism.  
 Ad Hoc Tribunal: This is a body responsible for the settlement of disputes. 
 Secretariat: This body is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the revenue 
pool (SACU, 2007).  
 
4.3 Key characteristics of the economies of SACU 
Members of the SACU have close economic relations going back over a century; four of 
its members forming part of a monetary union (Kirk & Stern, 2003). SACU region is 
completely dominated by South Africa in terms of economic size and population size.  
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McCarthy (2008:1) states that the inequality in economic size and levels of development 
among the SACU member states is extreme, and this sometimes frustrates the progress of 
the customs union. South Africa contributes over 90% of the SACU GDP and completely 
dominates other members in terms of size and because it is industrially advanced. As 
mentioned earlier that the small members of SACU depend heavily on South Africa in 
terms of trade, investment and (migrant) employment (Kirk & Stern, 2003). The South 
African companies completely dominate the business landscape of the Southern Africa 
region (Mbeki, 2005; Kirk & Stern, 2003).  
 
The South African economy is based on the extraction of natural resources, but is much 
more diversified than any of the BLNS countries. Although South Africa has dominating 
the region, Botswana‟s economy has been experiencing the highest growth rate than all 
other countries in the region over the past decades. Botswana‟s economy, according to 
Kirk and Stern (2003) and CIA (2010), is dominated by the mining industry (i.e. the 
exploration of the diamond). The Namibian economy is also dominated by the mining 
sector. The Swaziland‟s economy is predominantly an agricultural economy (Kirk & 
Stern, 2003). Lesotho remains the poorest economy in the region, and it is heavily 
dependent on SACU revenues and on remittances from migrants working in South 
African mines, though the numbers employed in the South African mines have declined 
over the past decade. Lesotho‟s economy is also based on agricultural economic 
activities and water, which is a major natural resource in the country (CIA, 2010). 
 
4.4 Macroeconomic convergence in SACU 
The co-movement of macroeconomic variables within SACU and among members is 
analogous. Members of SACU share relatively similar macroeconomic policies (such as 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies) because of the CMA arrangement. Maleke 
(2008:70) argues that the SACU member countries have achieved a reasonable level of 
convergence in terms of macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, inflation, GDP 
growth rates and interest rates. South Africa‟s economic dominance in the region means 
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that changes in its domestic economic policy may affect its neighbours, especially other 
members of SACU. As Guma (1985:177) argues: “The effects of South African 
economic policy are quickly transmitted to other members via the fixed exchange rate 
and other factors mobility, whilst reverse flows of causation are likely to be negligible. 
Thus, not only must the rates of inflation and interest rate structure in all members 
approximate those obtained in South Africa but, in addition, monetary and fiscal shocks 
originating from South Africa must elicit an immediate response in the other countries.”  
 
Harvey (2000) and Jenkins and Thomas (1997) have shown that there is little 
convergence between SADC countries, whereas there is major convergence of SACU 
member countries. According to the African Development Bank Report (2004:i) and 
Maleke (2008), members of SACU have reached a very high level of stability and 
macroeconomic convergence in terms of their fiscal and monetary policies, inflation 
rates, interest rates as well as per capita incomes. The fiscal deficits are much lower 
among SACU members than non-SACU SADC members, with the former averaging 1.6 
% of the GDP for the period 2000-2003 and the latter averaging 5.6 %. In addition, with 
the exception of Lesotho, all SACU members have a lower external debt ratio, below 25 
% of the GDP (ADBR, 2004:6-7).  
 
Jenkins and Thomas (1997:23) also note that there is a marked pattern of convergence 
amongst the SACU countries, with Botswana and Lesotho “catching up” with other 
member states in terms of economic progress and development. It is important to note 
that macroeconomic convergence is critical for the long-term sustainability of a monetary 
union. Having noted the magnitude of macroeconomic convergence between members of 
SACU, one can argue that members of SACU would share similar regional shocks. 
Hence, this makes members of SACU suitable and compatible candidates for a currency 





Ricci (1997:7) raises a very interesting point, arguing that even in the EMU, which is the 
most plausible model of the monetary integration to date, the correlation of shocks was 
low, and labour and capital mobility were relatively scarce among its members prior to 
the formation of the union. Similarly, Mulhearn et al. (2001:361) suggest that the 
business cycles among the EMU members were not presences from the entry into the 
monetary union, but the strong political drive to establish a flourishing monetary union 
overcame what were perceived as narrow technical objections.  
 
Overall, the picture provided by convergence indicators suggests that members of SACU 
share some policy preferences. Macroeconomic convergence among the SACU countries 
could be attributed to the fact that members of SACU have adopted domestic policies 
that engender low inflation rates, fiscal deficits and public debts in order to promote trade 
and investment. This gives credence to the argument that SACU members have achieved 
the economic requisite for forming a currency area.  
 
4.5 The economic performance of SACU 
Of the SACU countries, South Africa has the broadest industrial base, expertise and 
technology. South Africa has emerged as a major source of investment in the Southern 
African region (Mbeki, 2005). The trade share of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (the BLNS countries) remains low. According to Khamfula and 
Tesfayohannes (2004:43), for the past five years South Africa‟s exports to the rest of the 
SADC region were three times higher than imports from the region. Lesotho and 
Swaziland are the lowest contributors to SACU‟s GDP, contributing 0.6 % and 0.9 % 











GDP (US$ million, 2000 
prices) 
 
% of SACU GDP 
Botswana  8.204 4.7 
Lesotho  988 0.6 
Namibia  4.231 2.4 
South Africa  159.695 91.4 
Swaziland  1.548 0.9 




Table 4.4: Estimates of BLNS Intra-SACU Imports, 2002/2003 
  
Country Intra-SACU Imports (R bn)  Excess 
(1) Reported by 
BLNS 
(2) Recorded by 
SARS (1-2)/(2) 
Botswana  
17.2 11.4 51% 
Lesotho  8.1 5 61% 
Namibia  13.9 10.9 28% 
Swaziland  12.5 10.4 20% 
South Africa  7 6 17% 
Total 58.7 43.8 34% 
Sources: Flatters and Stern (2005) 
 
It is important to note that there are some discrepancies between the import data reported 
by BLNS members and the export data for the same trade recorded by SARS.  According 
to Flatters and Stern (2005), each member state has a strong interest in estimating such 
import values in order to enhance its share of the pool. In both records, Botswana is at 
the top, followed by Namibia and Swaziland. Lesotho and South Africa were at the 







Table 4.5: SACU Members’ Intra-SACU and Total Imports 
Country 
Imports (R million)  Ratio 
(1) Intra-SACU (2002/03) 
(2) Total Imports 
(1)/(2) - 2002 
Botswana  17165 18434 93% 
Lesotho  8073 9194 88% 
Namibia  13943 15800 88% 
Swaziland  12453 11977 104% 
South Africa  7045 318272 2% 
Total 58679 373677 16% 
Sources: Flatters and Stern (2005) 
 
Table 4.5 demonstrates that Botswana had the highest rate of intra-SACU imports, with 
93 % of all imports from all sources; it was followed by Lesotho and Namibia, both with 
88 %. Swaziland imported more than SACU member countries; its intra-SACU imports 
amounted to 104 %. South Africa imported only 2%. This indeed shows that South 
Africa is dominant in the union. The BLNS countries import more goods from South 
Africa than South Africa imports from them. Table 4.5 shows the GPD structure in 
SACU countries.  
 











Botswana  2.3 53.3 3.9 44.4 
Lesotho  17.3 41.4 18.5 41.3 
Namibia  9.9 31.7 13.5 58.4 
South Africa  2.5 30.3 18.6 67.1 
Swaziland  11.5 47.6 36.9 40.9 
Source: Braude and Sekolokwane (2007) 
 
The above table clearly shows unequal levels of development within SACU. South 
Africa has shown labour capacity (services) and manufacturing skills followed by 
Botswana. In Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, the economies are less diverse.  In light 
of SACU‟s potential to be the best institution through which to ensure regional 
integration in Africa, it is fitting to compare it with other African regional trade blocs as 
well as the successful trade blocs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
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and the European Union (EU). The comparative analysis (see Appendix C) reveals that, 
SACU shares 61,3 % of that of successful attributed to the successful trade blocs, while 
SADC rated 48,3 %, COMESA 32,5 % and the EAC 52,5 % (Venter & Neuland, 2007). 
This indicates and confirms that SACU is a good example of a regional economic 
integration body that is operating relatively efficiently in Africa.  
 
4.6  SACU and international agreements 
Many countries or regions across the world have signed cooperation agreements with the 
intention of accessing, among other things, others‟ markets, technology, lower 
transaction costs, labour and human capital and take advantage of economies of scale 
that would not occur in small markets limited by trade barriers. Likewise, SACU and its 
members see international agreements as a strategy for acquiring development (i.e. 
capacity/infrastructure/know-how) and economic linkages and as an opportunity to 
assimilate into the global economy.  
 
Members of SACU are highly open towards each other and even towards the global 
economy. They have trade-oriented economies and firmly support the concept of free 
trade and; all SACU‟s members are signatories of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
SACU has signed several trade agreements, namely the SADC Trade Protocols, SACU-
Mercosur Preferential Trade Agreement, SACU-EFTA Trade Agreement, SACU-India 
Trade Negotiations, and the SACU-China Trade Negotiations (Tralac, 2005; SACU, 
2007; Braude & Sekolokwane, 2008). These agreements offer SACU member states easy 
access and exposure to other, larger regional markets and could serve as a trading base 







4.7  SACU vs. the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SACU finds itself operating alongside similar organisations such as COMESA and the 
SADC. The most worrying outcome from such parallel organisations is “policy conflict” 
(Khamfula & Tesfayohannes, 2004:40). As demonstrated in 1977 with the EAC, a policy 
conflict played a significant part in its demise (Mkenda, 2001). The SADC was formed 
in 1992 as an evolution of the Southern African Development Community Cooperation 
(SADCC). Members of the SADC include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SADC is 
committed to the abolishment of all forms of external protection measures imposed on 
countries in the Southern African region and the creation of a common market with free 
movement of factors of production to ensure that equitable and sustainable development 
becomes a reality. The SADC has set the following milestones to be achieved by 2018.  
 
Figure 4.2: Macroeconomic Convergence Goals for SADC 
 
Sources: own calculations from SADC (2007) 
 
In order to achieve its macroeconomic convergence goals, the SADC has adopted formal 
frameworks and time frames to guide its integration process and to promote the harmony 
and progressive convergence of national economic structures and macroeconomic 
policies. Macroeconomic convergence targets are as follows: (i) inflation is to be reduced 
to single-digit levels by 2008, to 5% by 2012, and to 3% by 2018; (ii) the ratio of the 
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budget deficit to GDP should not exceed 5% by 2008, should be between 3% and 1% by 
2012 and be maintained at the 2012 level up until 2018; (iii) the nominal value of public 
and publicly guaranteed debt should be less than 60% of the GDP by 2008, and should be 
maintained through-out the period (until 2018); and (iv) the current account deficit 
should be less than 9% of the GDP by 2008 (SADC, 2007).  
 
These convergence targets were set in light of the fact that macroeconomic stability 
should precede the formation of a monetary union in order to guide and integrate key 
aspects of future economic and financial policies among the SADC member countries. 
The convergence targets for the SADC Monetary Union are quite feasible for all SACU 
member states. For instance, all SACU countries, except Lesotho, have average public 
debt ratios below the 60% benchmark GDP (Maruping, 2005). However, as yet the 
SADC deepening of economic integration has not yet been fulfilled (i.e. such as customs 
union 2010).  
 
The SADC members aim to form a monetary union by 2016 and launch a regional 
currency for the monetary union by 2018. This will facilitate the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and labour across national borders and eventually lead to full 
regional monetary integration. SADC and SACU have similar regional integration 
mandates, but the modalities and strategies to achieve their objectives differ. Looking at 
the two organisations‟ respective trade objectives shows that they converge in some areas 
and diverge in others. Table 4.9 shows the similarities and differences between SACU‟s 


















To further liberalise 
intra-regional trade in 
goods and services on 
the basis of fair, 
mutually equitable and 
beneficial trade 
arrangements 
To facilitate the cross-
border movement of 
goods between the 




To contribute towards 
the improvement of the 
climate for domestic, 
cross-border and foreign 
investment 
To substantially increase 
investment opportunities 




To enhance the 
economic diversification 
and industrialisation of 
the region 









national and regional 
strategies and 
programmes 
To facilitate the 
development of common 
policies and strategies 
Diverge 
5 
To establish a Free 
Trade Area in the SADC 
region 
To promote the 
integration of member 
states into the global 
economy through 
enhanced trade and 
investment 
Diverge 
Source: SACU (2008); SADC (2007) 
 
From the above table one can see that there is relative convergence on the objectives. 
Even though the objectives are not identical, but both regions tend to pursue the same 
goals of promoting free movement of goods within their region, make an effort to 
increase investment in their region and desire to diversify and industrialise their 
economic region. These factors seem to bolster the integration of SADC markets. Thus, 
countries that are members of more than one group will have to choose between them, as 
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it is impractical to claim membership with different customs unions. Should the SADC 
succeed in realising its targets, it is likely that SACU will be incorporated into the SADC 
customs union. Khamfula and Tesfayohannes (2004:42) suggest that the SADC members 
should start by adopting a common monetary area (CMA) such as the one adopted by 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.  
 
4.8  The challenges and the future of SACU 
In addition to the challenges addressed earlier (see page 56), members of SACU have 
different economic profiles and levels of development. Moreover, they all face the 
problems of poverty alleviation and income distribution, HIV/AIDS and a high 
unemployment rate. Members‟ lack of resources to finance customs union programmes, 
SACU personnel and the implementation of a proper institutional structure is highly 
problematic. SACU‟s lack of autonomy (chiefly due to members‟ multiple memberships 
and complications this introduces) means that it lacks internal policy-making capabilities, 
which undermines its ability to forge good intra-regional trade relationships.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that SACU is grounded on economic motivations, the lack of 
real political will and sustained commitment between member states threatens its 
viability. The recent EPA episode demonstrated members‟ inability to balance their 
national interests and those of the region as a whole. As Erasmus (2008) argues, the 
council and commission appear to represent national interest rather than the common 
interest of the region. To summarise the challenges that SACU faces: 
 
 The disparities between SACU member states‟ economic size and the levels of 
development are extreme and sometimes problematic, thwarting the progress of the 
customs union (McCarthy, 2008:1).  
 
 SACU does not have its own budget nor the comprehensive authority to make laws 




 SACU members do not have industrial strategies specifically aligned with the 
customs union‟s objective; as such, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are 
weakened and SACU‟s administrative capacity is unnecessary burdened (Yang & 
Gupta, 2005:6).  
 
 Transport and communication infrastructure remains a significant challenge for 
SACU countries. 
 
 SACU often lacks the authority and the resources to implement its initiatives due to 
lack of policy coordination with members, resulting in members, failure to comply 
with agreements and a breakdown in its effectiveness. The case of the EPA refers.  
 
 SACU members‟ multiple memberships (i.e. belonging to SACU as well as the 
SADC and/or COMESA) cause conflicts in terms of policy objectives and loyalty to 
various treaties, and limit SACU‟s ability to implement its initiatives. Moreover, 
several SACU/SADC member countries are members of the CMA and COMESA, 





























East Africa            
Burundi    X       
Comoros    X       
Djibouti    X       
Kenya    X     X 
Mauritius  X X       
Madagascar    X       
Uganda    X     X 
Eritrea    X       
Rwanda    X       
Tanzania  X X     X 
Seychelles  X X       
Sudan    X       
Somalia            
Southern Africa            
Angola  X X       
Botswana  X   X     
D.R. Congo X X       
Lesotho  X   X X   
Madagascar X     
Malawi  X X       
Mozambique  X         
Namibia  X   X X   
South Africa  X   X X   
Swaziland  X X X X   
Zambia  X X       
Zimbabwe  X X       
Total 15 19 5 4 3 
Source: - Own Calculations from the World Bank (2004) 
 
In addition, all of these countries are simultaneously involved in individual trade and 
developmental bilateral or multilateral agreements. This can create conundrum for the 
way forward and must be addressed immediately, otherwise SACU and its members will 
suffer for it. Table 4.8 shows the serious overlaps of membership of Eastern Africa and 
Southern African countries‟ regional organizations.  
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Turning to the future of SACU, it will only succeed if it manages to balance the interests 
of all of its members, who will need to proactively determine SACU‟s efficient 
functioning. Other successful regional integration initiatives (such as the EMU) relied on 
frequent consultation, surveillance, participatory processes and political commitment – 
these factors are essential ingredients for any successful regional integration, and SACU 
needs to incorporate such measures into its efforts. Members of SACU have the potential 
and capacity to bring about meaningful integration. This potential, however, will largely 
depend on SACU member states‟ willingness to initiate a deeper level of cooperation and 
concretise a well-defined vision and a greater sense of community. Keeping the long-
term goals and the move towards regionalism in mind, Venter and Neuland (2007) 
suggested several important steps to be taken by the Eastern and Southern African 
regional economic groups to ensure their efficacy and viability. These include: 
 
 Coordinated regional planning and the pooling of regional resources; 
 Reversing the brain drain and national and regional capacity building;  
 Creating “think tanks” and the promoting educational programmes; and 
 Improving healthcare and SMME development (Venter & Neuland, 2007:217).  
 
4.9  Conclusion 
SACU embodies the most advanced form of regional integration in the African continent. 
It provides for the duty-free movement of goods and services between member countries 
and for a common external tariffs, but also goes beyond being a pure customs union in 
that it provides excise duties as well. SACU can evolve beyond its present customs union 
structure to become either a common market or a monetary union. To achieve such 
profound integration, members of SACU need to share a common vision, engender 
political commitment to regional integration, and align their domestic trade policies and 
regional industrial development strategies in such a way that national interests advance 
regional goals. South Africa‟s Trade and Industry Minister, Rob Davies (2009:1), 
concurs and adds that SACU‟s commission must prioritise regional integration 
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practically, not just in broad declaratory statements. SACU has advanced its integration 
more than what is required in a Customs Union; four of its Members are cooperating in 































THE RAND MONETARY AREA AGREEMENT 
5.1.  Introduction 
As previously noted, SACU members, except Botswana, belong to a common monetary 
area (CMA). Although Botswana is not a formal member of the CMA, it is regarded as a 
de facto member (Grandes, 2003). The CMA encompasses South Africa and smaller 
countries, namely Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (LNS states), which integrates them 
into the South African money and capital markets. The CMA countries are thus closely 
connected with South Africa in terms of trade and macroeconomic inter-relationships, 
and, Botswana being a de facto member of the CMA group (Grandes, 2003), it has also 
been converging in line with the CMA group countries.  
 
It is arguable that CMA member countries are quite sensitive to the movement of South 
African interest rates. As Aziakpono (2008:189) argues, among SACU‟s BLNS countries 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), their financial systems are highly 
dependent on South Africa‟s, which suggests that monetary unification and a common 
monetary policy for the union is feasible. This chapter starts by briefly discussing the 
CMA (known as a Rand Monetary Area) and its implications for SACU member 
countries. It further reviews the selected empirical studies on SACU members‟ economic 
suitability to form a currency union, and assesses their economies in terms of their 
readiness for monetary integration based on the OCA criteria.  
 
5.2  History of the formation and development of the CMA 
In 1974, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland signed the Rand Monetary 
Area agreement. In 1975, Botswana opted to withdraw from the RMA and launched its 
own currency, the pula. However, Botswana did not allow the real pula-rand exchange 
rate to diverge and the two currencies are interchangeable (Grandes, 2003). The RMA 
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was superseded by the CMA in 1986, and the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA) of 
1992 resulted; the latter also includes Namibia (Wang et al., 2007; Venter & Neuland, 
2007). Appendix A gives a detailed description of the historical development of the 
CMA. Membership in the CMA implies that LNS countries lose control over the nominal 
exchange rate as an instrument of economic policy. In addition, the free flow of capital 
between the CMA groups ensures that interest rates are determined in the large 
money/capital markets of South Africa. 
 
The main objectives of the CMA were (and are) to implement common exchange 
controls and the free movement of funds between contracting parties (Venter & Neuland, 
2007:163) in order to sustain the economic development of the contracting parties, 
especially with respect to facilitating the advancement of the less developed member 
states and equitable benefits for all members. Under the CMA arrangement, the LNS 
countries are linked 1:1 with the South African Rand (Grandes, 2003). The economic 
factors of the LNS countries do not affect the value of their currency and, hence, 
development in the exchange rate dependent on the underlying factors affecting the 
South African Rand‟s performance against other currencies. The rand is a free-floating 
currency and is a legal tender in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.  
 
According to Aziakpono (2003), all members of SACU have a history with the rand 
being a legal tender. The members of the CMA group have a similar set of policy 
preferences. The CMA members, together with Botswana, have demonstrated evidence 
of convergence: they have a common currency, similar inflation rates, interest rates and 
narrowly fluctuating real bilateral exchange rates. The other members of the CMA group, 
namely the LNS countries, follow policies that strongly reflect South Africa‟s 
preferences for good finance practice and price stability. As a result of the parity 
maintained against the South African Rand by currencies of other contracting parties, all 
of the CMA countries have the same exchange rate against outside currencies. The small-
scale CMA members (with the exception of Swaziland) do not have the option to change 
their exchange rates to attain or maintain external competitiveness (Grandes, 2003). 
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The CMA arrangement means that members are not limited with respect to both current 
and capital account transactions (Aziakpono, 2008:190). The CMA members hold 
regular consultations to facilitate and ensure continued compliance with the CMA‟s 
requirements and to reconcile different interests when formulating and implementing 
CMA monetary and foreign exchange policies. The CMA membership limits the LNS 
countries‟ discretion over their monetary and exchange rate policies (Vollan, 2000:76). 
This makes it difficult for the LNS countries to react timeously to external shocks unless 
they coordinate decisions with South Africa.  
 
According to Aziakpono (2008:190), “Botswana‟s currency, the pula, has remained 
informally linked to the rand through a currency basket where, since 1990, the latter 
weighs around 60 to 70% […] Botswana would be regarded as a de facto member of 
CMA.” The South African Reserve Bank has been mandated to monitor and determine 
the processes of controlling money supply and it serves as a settlement centre for the 
CMA countries (Vollan, 2000:78). The members of the CMA arrangement have access 
to capital markets, foreign exchange transactions, and compensatory payments for 
seigniorage forgone by using the South African Rand. 
 
Notwithstanding the LNS countries‟ limitation on policy discretion, they have benefited 
from the credibility of the South African Reserve Bank‟s (SARB) policies, and the CMA 
allows an unrestricted transfer of funds without any transaction costs and foreign 
exchange risks, whether for current or capital transactions, between CMA member 
countries; this has facilitated cross-border trade among them. As the South African Rand 
is a legal tender in these countries, economic activity is facilitated because of the 
transferability of funds within the CMA. More importantly, the CMA member countries 
have been very committed to and have sustained the terms of the agreement. As such, the 
CMA group has made significant strides in promoting trade, free movement of factors of 
production and harmonisation of economic policies. Members of the CMA have 
abolished their own national borders in terms of factors of production flows across 
member countries. Grandes (2003) argues that the CMA countries, together with 
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Botswana, form an optimum currency area. Although Botswana is not a member of the 
CMA, its monetary and financial systems have been informally linked to the South 
African financial system.  
 
Furthermore, other SACU countries‟ financial integration with and dependence on the 
South African financial system has been found by Aziakpono (2006; 2008), Matsaseng 
(2008) and others. This indicates that South Africa‟s monetary policy is transmitted to 
CMA members and to Botswana through interest and exchange rates. Ingram (1962) 
suggests that if countries are highly integrated in terms of financial trading, then capital 
flows can smooth or eliminate potential sources of temporary asymmetric shocks. The 
evidence suggests that members of SACU are financially integrated and are good 
candidates for a currency area (Aziakpono, 2008).  
 
5.3  Monetary policy in the CMA group and Botswana 
The monetary policy developments in SACU closely follow developments in South 
Africa, the biggest and dominant economy in the zone. It is widely recognised that the 
LNS countries‟ monetary policies are entwined with South Africa‟s via CMA 
arrangement. Guma (1985:166) points out that, “The currency and monetary systems of 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, although now structurally different, evolved from an 
informal integration into the South African economic and monetary orbit”. Monetary 
policies in the LNS countries are geared towards maintaining the 1:1 parity of their 
domestic currencies with the South African Rand:  
 
Monetary and exchange rate developments in Southern Africa closely 
follow developments in South Africa, the largest economy of the zone. 
Three countries, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, have their currencies 
pegged to the South African rand at parity under the Common Monetary 
Area. The rand is also a currency of reference in Botswana (African 





Notwithstanding the fact that all members of the CMA have their own central banks 
responsible for their monetary policy, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
effectively formulates the monetary policy of the CMA countries (Mboweni, 2006:9). 
Consequently, the members also indirectly adhere to an inflation-targeting monetary 
policy framework that South Africa is currently pursuing; however, it is possible that 
some deviations in interest and inflation rates could occur. It is important to note that the 
CMA recognises that each member is responsible for its own monetary policy and the 
control of its financial institutions.  
 
The main objective of these countries‟ monetary policies is to ensure that their exchange 
rate linkage to the South African Rand is maintained and that interest rates are kept at 
levels that prevent any distortion of the exchange rate (Grandes, 2004). It should be 
noted that the similarities in monetary policies are regarded as an important prerequisite 
for the successful implementation and sustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Coordination of SACU members‟ monetary policies can serve as a stepping-stone to 
monetary unification and a common monetary policy for the union. Given the strong 
coordination of monetary policies, members of SACU have a solid foundation from 
which to establish a fully-fledged monetary union.  
 
5.4  Exchange rate coordination in the CMA group and Botswana 
Within the CMA, there are no exchange control restrictions and the exchange rates 
among the four currencies (the Loti of Lesotho, the Namibian Dollar, the Lilangeni of 
Swaziland and the Rand of South Africa) have been maintained at equal value.  South 
Africa, as the dominant and biggest economy in the arrangement, has been responsible 
for setting up terms and policies such as the monetary policy and exchange rate policy. 
For the LNS countries, the expected exchange rate change is always zero, as their local 
currencies are directly pegged to the South African Rand. As a member of the CMA, the 
LNS countries and South Africa are subjected to CMA foreign exchange regulations and 
the expected exchange rate change is against the ZAR. According to Grandes (2003:13), 
69 
 
the real exchange rate (RER) between the CMA countries and Botswana vary in a similar 
way, indicating that the underlying economic shocks or policy responses to them do not 
spark divergent relative price effects. Hence, the more open the countries are (Grandes, 
2003:14), the less there is need for different RER adjustments and the more their CPIs 
should be correlated. Furthermore, according to Matsaseng (2008:186), a floating 
exchange rate between South Africa and Botswana might not be essential and, as a result, 
Botswana would make a good candidate for a monetary union with the CMA group. 
 




























Botswana South Africa Average
 
 Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009). 
 
The above figure shows that Botswana and South Africa‟s exchange rates vary in a 
similar way and indicating that the underlying economic shocks in these countries are 
relatively similar and they do not park essential divergent of  price effects. Therefore, the 
CMA group together with Botswana can be good candidates for a currency area. It 
should also be noted that Botswana has linked its currency (pula) to the South African 
currency, the rand. In fact, the rand is also a currency of reference in Botswana and, thus, 
Botswana is also regarded as a de facto member of CMA group (Grandes, 2003). The 





5.5  The impact of the CMA arrangement on SACU 
The CMA arrangement will play a pivotal role if SACU and its members can establish a 
fully-fledged monetary union. Grandes (2003:3) argues that the characteristics 
demonstrated by the SACU region suggest the existence of an optimum currency area. 
Similarly, Matsaseng (2008) examined SADC countries‟ readiness for macroeconomic 
convergence and monetary unification and the extent of price flexibility within the CMA 
group, and concluded that the CMA countries have managed to foster price flexibility 
between members. He further suggested that CMA members and Botswana would be 
good partners in the formation of a monetary union as opposed to all of the SADC 
member countries (2008:187).  
 
The CMA arrangement offers member countries an opportunity to easily access a good 
financial regional market. However, according to Tjirongo (1995), there has been no 
substantive increase of intra-trade between the CMA member states. The CMA 
arrangement serves as an appropriate framework to ensure medium to long-term price 
and interest rate stability, thus enhancing investor confidence in the economy. This kind 
of economic environment is critical for SACU and its members‟ drive towards 
accomplishing economic growth and sustainable development. According to Thiam 
(2002), it is easier for countries that have been pursuing relatively similar monetary 
policies to adjust to a single monetary policy. Accordingly, it should be relatively easy 
for members of SACU to adapt to a common monetary policy. Making concerted efforts 
to coordinate, members of SACU could achieve some agreed upon convergence criteria 
and become a full monetary union.  
 
5.6  SACU countries and empirical evidence 
There is a vast body of literature and empirical work on optimum currency areas, and it is 
rich in terms of its scope and depth. However, there is a paucity of empirical work on 
SACU. Gama (1985:168) notes that the “Southern African region could be considered as 
having the potential to become an optimum currency area. Given the existence of factor 
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mobility, exchange-rate policy could be eschewed; all that would seem to be required is 
gradual elimination of existing impediments to factor mobility and consensus on the 
management of the exchange rate”.  
 
A study by Grandes (2004) investigates two questions: (i) Has the ongoing monetary 
integration in Southern Africa‟s common monetary area (CMA) constituted an optimal 
currency area? (ii) What are the costs and benefits for countries participating in the 
CMA? The generalised purchasing power parity (G-PPP) modelling technique was used 
to investigate these questions. He concludes that the CMA group and Botswana as a de 
facto member form an OCA and the benefits for the CMA membership is free capital 
movement and free exchange rate while the costs is associated with the loss of 
seigniorage. Matsaseng (2008) investigated the presence of flexibility within the CMA as 
compared to a selected group of Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC) 
countries using the purchasing power parity (PPP) model. The results indicate that there 
is a high degree of price flexibility and quick adjustment in prices for CMA countries, 
and Botswana converges with the CMA group too. He concluded that a monetary union is 
a feasible option for CMA group and Botswana (Matsaseng, 2008: 176).  
 
Using cointegration and error correction modelling techniques, as well as impulse 
response analysis, Aziakpono (2006; 2008) investigated the extent of financial integration 
amongst the SACU countries. He found that SACU countries‟ financial systems heavily 
rely on South Africa‟s financial system, which indicates that a monetary union is a 
feasible option for the customs union. All of these empirical studies support Grandes‟ 
(2004) hypothesis – that the CMA group constitutes an optimum currency area. This 
being the case, monetary unification and a monetary policy that uses a single central 







5.7  Optimum currency area criteria and SACU 
As seen earlier, literature on optimum currency areas from the 1960s and 1970s has 
proposed a number of possible criteria that countries should ideally fulfil in order to 
ensure a successful monetary union. These include international factor mobility, 
openness, product diversification, inter-regional prices and wage flexibility, 
macroeconomic convergence, and similar inflation rates and policy preferences. SACU‟s 
viability as a common currency union must be assessed using similar criteria from the 
economic literature. The aforementioned factors are considered next. 
 
5.7.1  International factor mobility 
Mundell (1961) raises the international factor (capital and labour) mobility as one of the 
crucial tenets for forming a currency union. As previously stated, his main argument is 
that, if the degree of factor mobility between the potential members is high, it can replace 
exchange rate flexibility in eliminating external disequilibrium and they would then be 
better candidates for a currency union. In other words, if countries or regions experience 
factor mobility, they “could form a currency union and rely upon factor mobility to 
assure trade balance with full employment at stable prices” (Guma, 1985:168).  
 
Historically, cross- border mobility of labor in the region was extensive (i.e. migrant 
workers employed in the South African mining sector) and there were no border controls 
between Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland (Crush, 1999). There is anecdotal 
evidence on the movement of skilled workers from the small countries, particularly 
Lesotho and Swaziland, to South Africa. The flows may have increased in recent years as 
growth accelerated in South Africa, in part reflecting changes in South Africa‟s 
immigration policy. The analysis of labor mobility is hampered by the scarcity of reliable 





When capital is generally mobile, due to a high degree of financial integration between 
the countries (or regions), short-term capital movements could finance any trade 
imbalance as long as the long-term capital movements affect ultimate economic 
adjustment (Scotovsky, 1958; Corden, 1962; Guma, 1985). According to Nielsen et al. 
(2005:710), “high capital mobility and hence degree of financial integration for instance 
will limit the ability of countries to undertake independent monetary policy even where 
labour is shown to be relatively immobile”. The capital mobility within the CMA group 
is high because the economic provisions of the CMA group encourage free capital 
movement. Khamfula and Tesfayohannes (2004:42) argue that the existence of the CMA 
arrangement in the region demonstrates the large amount of capital and degree of money 
market integration among the member countries. However, the financial flow within the 
CMA is one-way, and is slanted towards South Africa‟s interest.  
 
Nielsen et al. (205:712) state that South Africa accounts for about 93 % of the region‟s 
direct investment abroad, 99 % of portfolio investment abroad and 87 % of total foreign 
investment assets in the region. The presence of a substantial financially integrated 
market within SACU has been found by, among others, Aziakpono (2006; 2008), 
Matsaseng (2008) and Nielsen et al. (2005). Schiava (2008:170) argues that financially 
integrated economies tend to display a good correlation of business cycles. Indeed, 
members of SACU experience similar business cycles given their integrated financial 
system. 
 
Rwakunda (2004:20) notes that if there is a high degree of international financial 
integration among countries or regions, exchange rate variations will not be needed to 
restore external equilibrium, since negligible changes in interest rates will give rise to 
efficient exchange rates within the area where financial integration exists. Frankel and 
Rose (1998) suggest that a currency union is more justifiable ex post than ex ante. 
Accordingly, as financial integration contributes to a greater mobility of factors of 




5.7.2  Openness of the economies 
According to McKinnon (1963), openness is one of the crucial tenets that determine the 
optimality of a single currency. Trade liberalisation indicates the extent of an economy‟s 
openness to the world market and is indicated by the ratio of exports and imports to the 
gross domestic product (GDP). McKinnon (1963) maintains that the more open an 
economy is, the lower the need for autonomous exchange and monetary policy as 
independent policy instruments, and, therefore, ceteris paribus, the more suitable and 
beneficial it will be to join a currency union.  
 
Members of SACU have embraced trade liberalisation as a strategy to gain better access 
to the world market. As a result, members of SACU are highly open towards each other 
and even towards the global economy (Jenkins & Thomas, 1997:19). According to the 
African Development Report (2004:90), “Southern Africa is heavily trade orientated, 
with a trade-to-GDP ratio of over 75 %. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland […] are 
the most open economies in the region”. In a similar vein, Grandes (2004:14) notes that 
members of SACU have highly open economies, whether looking at trade flows in 
relation to GDP or tradability according to the consumer price index, which makes their 
economies vulnerable to foreign price developments.  
 
Members of SACU have adopted trade-oriented reforms and firmly support the concept 
of free trade; all of them are signatories of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which 
is a key organ in the management and governance of global trade. For example, members 
of SACU are embarking on and promoting both bilateral and multilateral free trade 
agreements with regional countries, having already signed agreements with India, the 
US, the SADC and Mercosur etc. Members of SACU are also beneficiaries of the US 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Moreover, members of SACU enjoy a 
free market economy with pricing determined by supply and demand, which results in an 
open economy within the union and economies open to the rest of the world. Using the 
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criterion of openness, one can therefore conclude that members of SACU can adopt a 
single currency. 
 
5.7.3  Product diversification 
Countries with productions and exports that are widely diversified and that have 
appropriately configured structures are better candidates for an OCA (Kenen, 1969). This 
is because the more diversified a country‟s products, the less likely it is to suffer from 
generalised adverse shocks and, thus, the less likely it is to need exchange rate 
adjustment (Kenen, 1969). Kenen‟s diversification criterion may not fully favour SACU 
countries for forming a currency (or monetary) union as some SACU members in 
particular the case of Botswana and Lesotho and to a lesser extent Namibia (as indicated 
in Figure 5.2 below) are still characterised by high exports concentration.  
 































          Botswana           Lesotho           Namibia
          South Africa           Swaziland
 
  Source: Own calculations from the UNCTAD (2009)  
 
It is instructive to note that in the case of Botswana and Namibia, their exports remain 
highly concentrated in minerals whilst in the case of Lesotho, the economy remains 
primarily dependent on subsistence agriculture. Overall, South Africa is the most 
diversified. According to Mbeki (2009) and Kalaba (2006), of all the SACU member 
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countries, South Africa has the broadest industrial base and expertise and better 
technology and capital. This has therefore facilitated South Africa‟s diversification.  
 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fact that members of SACU have different industrial 
structures and different levels of development, they still exhibit high covariation in their 
economic activities, which makes them potentially good candidates for a common 
currency. Even if countries have different levels of development, free trade could be 
beneficial because countries would benefit from economies of scale, and lower 
production costs.  
 
5.7.4  Inter-regional price and wage flexibility 
Inter-regional price and wage flexibility is one of the important tenets of the OCA theory. 
It is premised on the notion that “it is possible to effect a change (increase or decrease) in 
real income of a region relative to another region without changing the apparent real 
income within the area” through wage and price adjustment (Matsaseng, 2008:178). 
However, if real wages and prices are sticky, they obstruct market-clearing conditions 
that smooth out fluctuations and restore external equilibrium.  
 
Matsaseng (2008) examined SADC countries‟ readiness for macroeconomic convergence 
and monetary unification and the extent of price flexibility within the CMA. He 
concluded that the CMA group has managed to foster price flexibility and, hence, the 
CMA group, together with Botswana, would make good candidates for the formation of a 
monetary union, as opposed to the whole of the SADC (2008:187). This clearly suggests 
that a floating exchange rate between SACU countries is not important. In other words, 
the variation in the CMA countries‟ and Botswana‟s exchange rates are quite similar, 
suggesting that the underlying economic shocks or policy responses to them would not 
spark divergent relative price effects. Thus, members of SACU can form an optimum 




5.7.5  Similar inflation rates 
The OCA theory suggests that countries whose inflation rates do not diverge 
significantly from those of their trading partners are good candidates for a currency 
domain. The divergence of inflation rates causes substantial fluctuations in terms of 
trade, thereby affecting the flow of goods and services, and heightening current account 
disequilibrium, which offsets exchange rate variations. However, if the inflation rates are 
identical among the countries, the terms of trade will not be affected and so, ceteris 
paribus, an equilibrated flow of current account transactions will take place within the 
area without exchange rate variations occurring (Rwakunda, 2004:22). 
 























South Africa Swaziland Average
 
  Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009), Central Bank of     
 Namibia (2010), Central Bank of Lesotho (2010), and African Economic Indicators (2010). 
 
The monetary union that exists in SACU is playing an important role in fostering 
macroeconomic convergence. This is also evident from the co-movement of inflation rate 
between the member countries (see Figure 5.6 above). Given the similarities of policy 
preferences between the SACU member countries, it is expected that the levels of 
inflation rates may not deviate a lot from each other due to the CMA group arrangement. 
It can also be expected that the LNS countries‟ discount and prime rates will drop in line 
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with South Africa‟s because their central banks maintain policies that align their rates 
with those of South Africa. There is significant inflation differential between countries 
and, thus, it will be easier to maintain the fixed exchange rate. 
 
Harvey (2000:8) argues that, “Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are bound to have 
similar inflation rates to that of South Africa, because money and goods flow freely 
between the four countries, and because the central banks of the three countries have a 
limited or zero power to finance budget deficits by money creation”. Botswana is also 
expected to have a similar inflation rate to those of the CMA group, because its currency, 
the pula, is informally linked to the rand in which the rand comprises a currency basket 
around 60 to 70 % (Grandes, 2003). Furthermore, the strong trade links that exist 
between SACU countries – particularly because BLNS countries depend on imports from 
South Africa, coupled with the fact that South African retailers operate in the BLNS 
countries using common pricing policies – reinforces the view that inflation and interest 
rates in the five countries must be closely linked. This implies that the costs of forming 
an OCA among the members of SACU will be negligible.  
 
In addition, given the small economies of BLNS countries relative to South Africa‟s 
economy, the interest rates may be considered exogenous to these economies. The 
interest rates in the BLNS countries have managed to balance attempts to obviate capital 
flight to South Africa and affordable investment costs in the domestic economies, with 
the aim of stimulating investment (Aziakpono, 2006:4). Low inflation differentials is one 
of the prerequisites for forming an optimum currency area and, therefore, the similarity 
of inflation rates among the SACU members suggests that members of SACU have 
achieved the economic requisite for establishing a currency area and are suitable 







5.7.6  Similarities in policy preferences 
Ingram (1969) and Haberler (1970) emphasise the degree of policy integration between 
countries as being a crucial criterion for forming a currency area. Countries that share 
similar policy preferences make good candidates for a monetary union, while those that 
do not share the same preferences make poor candidates. For example, according to 
Willett and Tower (1970), a country that tolerates low inflation and a country that 
tolerates low employment would make poor candidates for a monetary union. Most 
SACU members already operate with a number of common policies (monetary-fiscal 
policies and exchange rate policies) and share a number of economic goals (e.g. free 
internal trade, price stability and some factor mobility, continual integration efforts in the 
economic sphere and the will to build a more united region). Members of SACU have 
display compatible macroeconomic policies, which indicates that; SACU has the 
rudimentary elements of monetary integration. It is therefore important to look at the 
foreseeable benefits and costs relevant to a common currency area within SACU member 
states. 
 
5.8  Benefits and costs of a currency union for SACU members 
The benefits SACU members would derive from establishing a common currency area 
are enormous; these benefits can create an economic environment that promotes growth 
and sustainable development and lowers the costs of doing business with each other. 
SACU members would benefit tremendously if SACU adopt a full-fledge monetary 
integration. The small members of SACU are already benefiting from SACU, as the 









5.8.1 The benefits 
Benefits of participating in a common currency area that are relevant to SACU members 
include a reduction in transaction costs, greater economic competitiveness, price 
stability, and less uncertainty with exchange fluctuation between member countries. As a 
result, members of SACU would be able to build robust and inclusive national 
economies at regional level by expanding local opportunities through linkages, real 
potential and competitive advantage. In addition, the member countries would be able to 
address local needs and contribute to both national and regional development objectives, 
such as ensuring economic growth, poverty alleviation, generating jobs and developing 
skills. 
 
5.8.1.1  Lower transaction costs on trade and financial flows 
The most visible and quantifiable benefits of participating in a common currency area are 
the lower transaction costs associated with trading goods (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 
1963) and the elimination of costs of exchanging one currency into another. These 
further simplify trade and reduce the costs of converting one currency into another, 
particularly relevant when dispatching goods and with other logistics that impede trade in 
the region. Furthermore, this will enhance trade and economic horizons, giving more 
access to less risky finance. This will generate economic specialisation (and thus more 
benefits), foster development based on local potential and facilitate participation in 
external trade.  
 
As noted earlier, the CMA agreements has allowed the small member countries to share 
the benefits of this integration along with the dominant economy in the sub-region; to 
those benefits includes, a lender of last resort, the distribution of seignorage, the common 
foreign exchange pool and the unlimited access to the South African financial market. 
The recent empirical evidence suggests that, currency unions significantly and positively 
affect trade (Rose, 2000) and income (Frankel & Rose, 2002). In addition, a currency 
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union would offer more prospects to expand and diversify their export markets and 
mitigate risks to external shocks. 
 
5.8.1.2   Greater economic competitiveness 
The monetary union will enable SACU members to build more resilient economies that 
could enhance productivity, intensify economic diversification, and improve their 
products‟ competitiveness in the global market. It will intensify cross-border competitive 
pressures geared to attract a wide range of investors, retailers and consumers, and, 
resulting in accelerated growth and development and the alleviation of poverty and 
unemployment. It should be highlighted that sustainable and competitive enterprises are 
a principal source of growth, wealth creation and employment. Trade and competition 
will be heightened in local markets, as prices in the area will be fully transparent and 
directly comparable. This could contribute towards building the economic capacity of the 
region and creating a more conducive local environment for business, trade and 
investment, and for sustainable development generally. It will further improved 
allocation of common market capital.  
 
5.8.1.3   Clear commitment to monetary-fiscal policies by SACU members 
According to Shaw (1973, McKinnon, 1973), financial deepening has a positive 
relationship with economic growth. A full monetary union would strengthen regional 
economic integration and yield additional benefits in terms of monetary policy credibility 
and fiscal policy prudence, and maintain exchange rate competitiveness in the region. 
This could help members of SACU to create an economic environment that is conducive 
to growth, can attract more investors and set the region on the road to achieving 
sustainable development. A currency union will enforce macroeconomic stability and 
speed up industrial growth in the region, and ultimately speed up the development of an 
export-oriented economy in the region. According to Metzger (2008:12), “Although 
South Africa dominates economic relations within SACU, the other members have 
nevertheless benefited from a highly redistributive revenue-sharing formula”. 
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Furthermore, a monetary union will improve allocation of resources to strategic priorities 
between countries and to focus on strengthening competitiveness, through the conduct of 
prudent fiscal policy and accelerated structural reforms. Overall, the monetary union will 
enhance investors‟ confidence in the SACU countries policies and synergies reduce 
South Africa‟s hegemony through a single central bank with the power to monitor 
economic policies, and improve the investment climate for local businesses, in the 
respective member countries. 
 
5.8.1.4  Elimination of exchange rate uncertainty 
The general benefit of establishing a currency area is that currency risks between union 
members disappear. It is well known that uncertainty is a major factor that prevents 
efficient cooperation. Many economists believe that exchange rate uncertainty reduces 
international trade and discourage investors. Dormac and Peria (2000) argue that, 
transparency and credibility associated with fixed exchange rate may insulate a country 
from contagion. The elimination of exchange rate uncertainty will enable investors to 
make decisions with some degree of long-term confidence and they will be encouraged 
to invest because a stable financial environment and high standards of financial 
responsibility and integrity will be maintained in the region.  
 
Gerber (2005:234) argues, the adoption of a common currency eliminates the foreign 
exchange rates uncertainties or risks across the currency area because the exchange risk 
premium will disappear. This will improve international trade and cash flow among the 
SACU countries as well as their concomitant contagion. Grandes (2004: 56) argues that 
“South Africa‟s capital flows to its partners help to smooth consumption in recipient 
countries, hence allowing some risk sharing.” It can be argued that all these benefit 
mentioned above, can materialised much more vividly than they are when SACU 





5.8.2  The costs 
There are substantial costs associated with adopting a common currency. This is simply 
because SACU member countries will lose their autonomy over their domestic policies 
because they will be subject to the decisions of a common central bank. It is certainly 
true that complete control of domestic policies will be forfeited by all member countries 
and that they will no longer be able to exercise unilateral control over their money supply 
or exchange rate. 
 
5.8.2. 1  Loss of autonomy over policies 
An immediate relevant cost to SACU members as a result of monetary integration is the 
loss of instruments to guide their economies (i.e. autonomy over their monetary policy 
and exchange rate policy). Members of SACU will lose autonomy, or the ability to 
respond proactively, if a distorting event is predicted. Furthermore, SACU members 
might not be able to align their economic policies with those of SACU to meet their 
specific needs, as well as socio-economic and development needs. This can reduce the 
political support for a currency union.  
 
5.9  Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it is evident that there are compelling economic reasons to 
suggest that it is in the interest of all SACU countries to promote intra-regional and 
economic cooperation. For instance, the formation of the CMA and the entwined 
monetary and exchange rate policies of SACU member states have already benefited 
SACU members – there is free movement of goods and funds in SACU and the CMA. 
Vital steps in transforming SACU from a customs union to a monetary union include 
convincing Botswana to rejoin the CMA arrangement and establishing a single central 
bank that will not only issue a single currency for all member states, but will also pool 
their foreign exchange reserves and coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies. Thus, 
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with respect to the traditional criteria mentioned above, there is evidence to suggest that 
the SACU countries can successfully form an OCA.  
 
Systematic empirical studies have also suggested that a common currency and monetary 
policy is a feasible option for SACU member countries due to the currency peg and to 
instruments akin to those of monetary union between four other SACU members, which 
belong to the CMA group (Grandes, 2003, 2004; Aziakpono, 2008; Matsaseng, 2008). 
Indeed, on the strength of this preliminary evidence presented above, it could be argued 
that SACU and its members have met the economic requisites for establishing a common 
currency and, therefore, members of SACU are suitable and compatible candidates for a 
common currency area. The adoption of a single currency will have both benefits and 
costs for members. The former will mainly comprise lower transaction costs and the 
elimination of currency risks. The latter will be caused by member countries‟ inability to 
pursue independent monetary policies to stabilise their economies. It can be beneficial 
for SACU countries to endorse and foster a common currency area. While the economic 
criteria discussed above are essential for determining the suitability of South African 
Customs Union for a monetary union, the geo-political factors play an equally important 

















 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The viability of a monetary union in Southern Africa has long been under discussion. 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest, and one of the most 
efficient, operating customs union and it has the potential to foster meaningful regional 
economic integration. SACU‟s member countries have laid a strong foundation in terms 
of trade relations, financial cooperation, and policy coordination. Members of SACU are 
recognisant of the benefits that regional economic integration and financial cooperation 
can bring about. Building upon the CMA arrangement as a core, SACU is in a good 
position to establish a fully-fledged monetary union. With some SACU members, 
macroeconomic policy coordination and harmonisation has demonstrated progressive 
alignment of exchange rates and monetary policies.  
 
Empirical evidence and international experience suggest that for monetary integration to 
be successful, countries intending to form a currency area must demonstrate convergence 
of macroeconomic indicators. This chapter ties in with chapter five and focuses, 
specifically, on the empirical test to investigate convergence or non-convergence of the 
key inter-country macroeconomic variable in real terms (i.e. GDP, GDP growth rate, 
CPI, interest rate, exports and imports).  
 
6.2 Method and data description 
6.2.1  Method 
Macroeconomic variables are supremely important and required before the monetary 
integration is formed. The convergences of macroeconomic variables enhance business 
cycle synchronisation and prepare the central bank to focus on the whole area when 
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setting up monetary policies. Convergence between countries on the key economic 
variable can be tested using several methods such as panel unit root test, vector auto-
regression model (VAR), sigma (σ) and beta (β) convergence. This study use graphical 
representation analysis and bivariate analysis correlations to analyse the synchronisation 
of macroeconomic convergence between variable and the existence of co-movement 
between variables between SACU members. The result from these two analyses will give 
an understanding in terms of macroeconomic convergence and the relationship that exists 
between variables and between SACU members.  
 
Most empirical studies following the optimum currency area approach have been 
descriptive (Goto & Hamada, 1994; Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1994; Taguchi, 1994), 
focusing on the costs of a monetary union, and studying the correlation of various 
macroeconomic variables. It is important to note that the correlation relations may 
change after the formation of a monetary union, as exchange rates are limited, which 
changes the behaviour of all economic agents; however, a negative correlation between 
the given macroeconomic variables does not necessarily mean that the two countries fail 
to meet the criteria to form an optimum currency area (Kwan, 1998).  
 
6.2.2 Data description  
It is informative to study macroeconomic variables for with a highly frequency data, but 
there are limitations on the availability of the long period data. This study uses the annual 
data of SACU member countries observed from 1970 to 2008. The panel was assembled 
from various sources: the IMF- International Financial Statistics, the United Nations 
Statistical Division, the Central Bank of Botswana, the Central Bank of Lesotho, the 
Central Bank of Namibia, the Central Bank of Swaziland, South African Reserve Bank, 
and the African Development Indicators. Due to data limitations for sample countries, 
some observations in our sample do not cover entirely the period under study. For 
analysis of CPI, interest rate and inflation rate there was a problem obtaining data that 
covers the period – 1970 to 2008. The analysis for GDP growth rates, CPI, inflation rate 
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and interest rate covers the period – 1971 to 2008, 1975 to 2008; 1980 to 2008 and 1990 
to 2008 respectively. The SPSS 15 was used to analyse the quantitative data. 
 
6.3  Empirical analysis 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 shows countries-specific values of the mean and standard deviations of 
macroeconomic variables under the investigation period. When the mean and standard 
deviations are declining and lesser the frequency, it means that the countries are 
converging. 
 
Table 6.1: The mean and standard deviations_________________________________ 
     GDP (growth rate) INFL           EXC        CPI            INT 
Country 1971-2008   1980-2008     1970-2008 1975-2008  1990-2008_____ 
Botswana        9,6(6,8)  69,5(45,3)      2,6(2,0)           44(37)          16(3,4) 
Lesotho           4,9(7,8)        73,5(50,5)    3,4(2,8)           51(37)         16(3,5) 
Namibia           3,6(3,6)        73,1(48,9)       3,4(2,8)           52(37)         16(3,5) 
South Africa    2,7(2,3)         72,(44,8)         3,4(2,8)           48(37)         16(3,4) 
Swaziland        5(9,9)         74,9(49,3)       3,4(2,8)           45(37)         16(3,7) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009), the African Development Indicators 
      (2010), the Central Bank of Botswana (2010), the Central Bank of Lesotho (2010), the Central  Bank of 
      Namibia (2010), the Central Bank of Swaziland, and United Nation Statistics (2009).  
 
Note: - values in parenthesis are standard deviations 
 
The low and closest levels of standard deviation between the five SACU member 
countries point to potential macroeconomics convergence. Variability of interest rates in 
slightly higher in Swaziland and Namibia while it is lower in Botswana, Lesotho and 
South Africa respectively. In terms of the CPI, all countries have achieved equal spread. 
As far as the exchange rate, Botswana has experience lowest spread (2.0) followed by all 
other countries with (2.8) spread. Similarly, there is less variability in Botswana‟s 




In summary, the above statistics analysis point to the possibility that members of SACU 
have manage to achieved reasonable levels of macroeconomic convergence, as Maleke 
(2008), Jenkins & Thomas (1997) and Grandes (2003) argue that members of SACU 
appears to form “a convergence club”. This means that members of SACU have 
rudimentary aspects for participating or establishing a monetary union. The following 
sections discuss graphical representation and the correlation results about convergence 
and the co-movement of macroeconomic variables. 
 
6.3.2 Graphical representation analysis 
The graphical representation analysis which is a simpler analysis for convergence is 
undertake to find out the extent to which the real gross domestic product (RGDP), real 
GDP growth rate, CPI, real interest rates, real exchange rates, real exports and real 
imports for SACU member countries move simultaneously. Figures 1 to 7 shows the 




Figure 6.1 show that from 1970 onwards, small SACU the countries were moving 
together, although Botswana and Namibia in the late 90s their real GDP picking-up 
respectively. This reflects the fact that these countries have a similar production structure 
(i.e. primary commodities) and low levels of industrial output. Botswana has experience 
the highest growth rate in the region since 1997 until the year data ended, although in 
2001 to 2002 the dramatic depreciation of the South Africa Rand prompted slowdown to 
all countries in the region. Botswana‟s growth rate is heavily driven by the exports of 
diamonds, which accounts for more one third of real GDP. Swaziland and Lesotho are 
lagging behind respectively, and both these countries rely on customs duties from SACU 



































Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland
 
  Source: - Own calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009). 
 
Lesotho, given that is a smallest country and its economy is largely based on subsistence 
agriculture and has severely affected by drought and the recent global financial crisis like 
all other countries. It is important to note that, despite small countries (BLNS) economies 
being heavily tied to their major trading partner – South Africa, their economic 
development vary quite substantially. This is also reflected in their real GDP‟s. South 
Africa and Botswana are ranked as upper middle-income countries, while Namibia and 
Swaziland are classified as lower middle-income countries, and Lesotho is a least 
developed country. More importantly, South Africa is one of the important economies on 
the African continent and its economic weight is felt across the continent. 
 
Real GDP growth rates  
Variations in real GDP growth rates have been reduced, not only across SACU countries 
but also over time within each country. Lesotho recorded its strongest performance in 
1972-74 due to among other things, higher agricultural output and wage remittances from 
migrant mineworkers in South Africa. Lesotho‟s economy is relatively open to external 
influence, mainly from South Africa and, as a result, it had experienced peaks and 
troughs. The economy stagnated in 1997-2001 due to the political disturbances in 1998, 
recurrent droughts and the fall in remittances from mineworkers. Swaziland, on other 
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hand, has recorded its strongest performance in 1974/5 and then followed by a slowdown 
in the following. Over the years, Swaziland‟s economy has been growing at a slow pace. 
The GDP growth rate grew at an annual average rate of 2.9 % during 2003 to 2008, 
mainly recurrent droughts and low external demand for some of Swaziland‟s traditional 
exports (i.e. textiles and clothing). Lack of growth in Swaziland is also a result of the 
declined of remittances of Swaziland migrant workers, as demand for unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers in South Africa fell. 
 













































  Source: - Own calculations form United Nations statistics (2009). 
 
Botswana has experienced the highest growth rates from 1997 until the year that the data 
ended. Botswana‟s growth rate can be attributed to the exploration of diamond and to a 
rallying global diamond and a regenerated demand from United States and Europe. 
Furthermore, Botswana has continued to make progress towards sound macroeconomic 
management and stability. Namibia experienced substantial positive growth rates in 1987 
and was then followed by a slowdown in the following year. The economy had recovered 
considerably during 1992, and continues to perform throughout the following years. 
South Africa had been going through slowdown in the early 1990s. In 1993, South Africa 
got a modest recovery and after 1994 gained a momentum as political instability come to 
an end after democratic elections. Both countries, economic performance since mid- 
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2000s has been impressive. Economic growth has picked up quite modestly against the 
backdrop of sound macroeconomic policy management.  
 
From 2000, all countries seem to be moving together, even though Botswana is growing 
faster than its counterparts – Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. It is import 
to note that Botswana and Namibia‟s peaks and troughs are more pronounced than the 
other countries. Botswana has been among the world‟s fastest growing economies over 
the two past decades. Botswana‟s GDP growth has average over 8% per annual, and its 
success can be attributed to a vast exploration of diamonds and sound economic policies.  
 
During the period, South Africa remained the richest and Lesotho the poorest country in 
the group in per capita terms. However, looking at the averages for all SACU countries, 
South Africa has been growing slower than the rest of the countries, followed by Lesotho 
and Swaziland. Botswana and Namibia were the fastest growing economies respectively. 
The income gaps between South Africa, Botswana and Namibia and Swaziland have also 
been reduced. In 1980s to early 1990s, all countries experienced a slowdown in growth 
rates which can be attributed to several factors – such as the fleeting increase in oil prices 
world-wide. Variations in real GDP growth rates have been reduced, not only across 
SACU countries but also over time within each country. The GDP growth rates analysis 
show that the economic growth rates for these countries were around 4% on average. 
 
Consumer price index (CPI) 
The price level (CPI) is an important indicator of macroeconomic stability. The CPI for 
SACU countries, as shown in Figure 6.5, is moving quite together. This synchronisation 
could be a result of the fact that price development in South Africa is linked to that of the 
BLNS countries through cross-border trade, and suggests a de facto common monetary 
policy within SACU. This confirms Matsaseng (2008) findings, which suggests that the 
CMA group has managed to foster price flexibility and Botswana can be a potential 
candidate for a monetary union with the CMA group. Such similar movement of 
commodity prices between the CMA countries and Botswana means that these five 
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countries are likely to share similar shocks and, therefore, are compatible and suitable 
candidates for a currency union.  
 
























South Africa Swaziland Average
 
  Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009). 
 
In 1989 to 1998, prices in Lesotho and Namibia were above the average. In 1997 and 
1998, the prices in Lesotho were high due to some political instability that occurred in 
the country. This CPI convergence shows the presence of macroeconomic 
interdependence among SACU member countries. This also confirms the Aziakpono 
(2008) findings, which reveals and suggests that there is a higher degree of dependence 
of the other SACU countries‟ financial systems on South Africa‟s financial system and 
the feasibility of a monetary union with a single central bank. It should be noted, 
however; that even if the law of one price prevails on tradable goods and services 
throughout the region, the consumer price indexes may not be perfectly synchronised due 
to the fact that the prices of non-tradable goods and services are not necessary moving 
simultaneously across the countries.   
 
Real interest rates 
The interest rate converge in real terms is quite important for the countries intending to 
establish a currency area. In other words, the interest rates convergence is necessary for 
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deeper integration among the countries. The similarities interest rates between the 
countries intending to establish a common currency indicate that those countries 
relatively share the same business cycles. Due to the currency peg, the monetary policy 
within the CMA arrangement is largely determined by the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) and the interest rates within the CMA area follow similar trends to that of South 
Africa‟s. Furthermore, the CMA membership is based on a close trade and financial links 
with South Africa. 
 
Given the geographical context and the dominance of the South African economy in the 
region, Botswana is also importing South Africa‟s interest rate (see Figure 6.4 below). It 
should be noted also that Botswana has pegged the pula to a trade-weighted basket rand. 
This can also induce convergence between Botswana and South Africa. Such 
convergence indicates a clear trend towards business-cycle assimilation among the 
SACU countries, and signifying a process of real convergence.   
 























Source: - Own Calculations from African Development Indicators, 2009, the Central Bank of  
 Botswana, 2010, the Central Bank of Lesotho, 2010, the Central Bank of Namibia, 2010,  








Real exchange rates 
A common trend is evident by visual inspection of the real exchange rates of the SACU 
countries. Figure 6.6 shows only for Botswana and South Africa‟s exchange rate 
movements. This is due to the fact other member of the CMA group, when trade in 
international market, they used the same exchange rate: the South African exchange rate, 
although the small member countries have not made an irrevocable commitment to keep 
a given parity. Tjirongo (1995, and Wang et al, 2007), argue that the exchange rate 
arrangements under the CMA group share certain characteristics of a currency board, but 
there is no legal constraint preventing the central banks for the small countries from 
acquiring domestic assets.  
 




























Botswana South Africa Average
 
  Source: - Own calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009). 
 
The exchange rate between Botswana and South Africa is very similar and the countries 
seem to be sharing the same turning point, meaning that the underlying economic shocks 
or policy responses to them do not spark divergent relative price effects (Grandes, 2003). 
It should also be noted that Botswana has linked its currency (pula) to the South African 
currency, the rand. In fact, the rand is also a currency of reference in Botswana and, thus, 
Botswana is also regarded as a de facto member of CMA group. The rand function as the 
regional anchor currency in the SACU area. In 2002, both countries reached the peak, 
95 
 
and this synchronisation means a similar movement for the other countries (i.e. LNS 
countries) since they are subjected to CMA foreign exchange regulations together with 
South Africa. Moreover, the small member countries of the CMA arrangement are 
following macroeconomic preferences of South Africa as a dominant country and their 
major trading partner in the region.  
 
Real exports  
Export is also an important indicator of macroeconomic stability, as it affects the current 
account. Figure 6.7 shows only Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The graph 
shows that Lesotho and Swaziland had been the lowest performing countries in the 
region respectively. This is not surprising for the fact that Lesotho and Swaziland are the 
smallest countries in the group, and subsuming their production structure, which is 
largely based on the primary product (i.e. agriculture is a key sector of the economy in 
both these countries) and net importers of services.  
 
The direction of Lesotho‟s and Swaziland‟s trade remains highly concentrated both in 
terms of markets and products and heavily dependent on South Africa and they send 
more than 60% of their exports to South Africa. The lack of exports performance in both 
these countries can also be attributed to recurrent droughts and low external demand of 
their traditional exports (i.e. textiles & clothing, sugar, and agricultural products). 
Botswana and Namibia have been performing relatively well over the past years. 
Botswana‟s high exports growth has been driven by mainly by booming diamond and 
other minerals (i.e. copper-nickel) and its stable currency whilst Namibia‟s exports has 
been boosted by diamond production and sustained strengthening of the non-mining 







































Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland
 
  Source: - Own Calculations from the United Nations Statistics (2009). 
 
It is import to note that Botswana‟s and Namibia‟s peaks and troughs are more 
pronounced than Lesotho and Swaziland. This is due to the fact that their exports depend 
on global economic prospects, especially in the major markets (e.g. the United States and 
Europe), which imports more 50% of their diamonds and their mineral resources.   
 
Real imports 
Figure 6.8 for real imports, which exclude South Africa and only shows Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. All SACU countries‟ economies are highly dependent 
on international trade: exports and imports of goods and services. The BLNS countries 
imports are mainly from South Africa and may have arrived via South Africa from 
another country of origin. All SACU countries are net importers of industrial products 
and services. The graphical representation shows that the imports of all these countries 
are relatively moving together, however; Lesotho and Swaziland imports are far less than 
the rest of the countries in the union. This is due to their economic size and other 
structural issues such as slow pace of industrial development and heavily reliance on the 
South African market which accounts about 70% or more of each of these countries‟ 




































Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland
 
  Source: - Own calculations from the United Nations Statistics (2009). 
 
The graphical analysis shows that SACU member countries are relatively moving 
together, although countries like South Africa, Botswana and Namibia are better than 
Swaziland and Lesotho owing their economic size and development at large. These 
results confirms findings of many studies among others, Maleke (2008), Matsaseng 
(2008), Aziakpono (2008), and Jenkins and Thomas (1997), who finds that members of 
SACU have made plausibly progress in terms of macroeconomic convergence (i.e. in 
terms of their fiscal and monetary policies, inflation rates, interest rates as well as per 
capita incomes). This then leads us to another approach for convergence analysis – 
bivariate correlation analysis between the countries.  
 
6.3.3 Bivariate analysis: correlations 
Another simpler analysis for synchronisation of macroeconomic convergence is to 
establish pair-correlation coefficient for each variable in order to inquest the existence of 
co-movement between variables. The correlation coefficient evaluates the relationship 
(or degree) to which the two variables are linearly related, and its ranges from -1 to 1. 
The correlation coefficient of 1 (positive value) means that the two variables are moving 
in the same direction at all times, whereas a correlation coefficient of -1 (negative value) 
indicates that two variables are moving in the opposite direction at all times; a correlation 
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coefficient of 0 indicates that two variables are uncorrelated (Brooks, 2002; Koop, 2009). 
However, if the coefficient is greater than 0.50 (in either direction- positive or negative), 
it indicates a significant correlation between two variables (Koop, 2009).  
 
It should be noted that SACU members have not decided on the convergence criteria, 
which they have committed to, except for the SADC region. The correlation matrices are 
only used to indentify if there is a possibility of convergence, and thus, they do not form 
the basis for quantifying the degrees of convergence. Table 6.2 reports the correlation 
coefficient for real GDP. It is evident from the results that the cross-sectional correlation 
coefficients are relatively high. The correlation coefficient for Botswana – Swaziland is 
0.98, for Lesotho and Namibia; correlation coefficients are 0.78 and 0.68 respectively. 
The correlation coefficient for all countries is significant at 0.01. The correlation 
coefficients signify the presence of co-movements.  
 
Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix (GDP) 
Country        South Africa Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland______________ 
   South Africa     1                  
   Botswana          0.98**         1               
   Lesotho             0.78**         0.69**       1         
   Namibia            0.68**         0.56**       0.92**    1            
   Swaziland         0.98**         0.94**       0.87**     0.78**      1      
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics, 2009. 
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
 
It is evident from the result that the cross-sectional coefficients for GDP growth are low 
(see table 6.3 below). The correlation coefficients are below 0.50, which means that there 
is no evidence of co-movement between countries. The Lesotho GDP growth has the 
highest level of co-movement with Botswana, with a correlation coefficient of 0.24. The 
correlation coefficients are 0.19 for Namibia and Swaziland, 0.07 for South Africa and 
Botswana, -0.17 for Botswana and Namibia, 0.24 Swaziland and South Africa, 0.05 for 
Botswana and Swaziland, -0.01 South Africa and Lesotho. Finally, for Lesotho – 
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Swaziland and Lesotho – Namibia, the correlation coefficients are -0.07 and -0.05 
respectively.  
 
Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix (GDP growth rate) 
Country        Botswana   Lesotho   Namibia    South Africa   Swaziland__________ 
   Botswana        1                  
   Lesotho           0.24**        1               
   Namibia        -0.17**       -0.05**       1         
   South Africa  0.07**       -0.01**      0.26**      1            
   Swaziland       0.05**       -0.07**     0.19**      0.24**              1      
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics, 2009. 
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
 
Further, CPI correlation coefficients (table 6.4 below) are higher between South Africa – 
Swaziland and Botswana – Namibia and Lesotho: they are 1.00, 099 and 0.98 
respectively. The other pairs are Botswana – Swaziland and Lesotho – Namibia; a 
correlation coefficient is at 1.00 and 0.99 respectively. These results support the findings 
from other authors like Jenkins and Thomas, Grandes, and Maleke, who argue that 
SACU members have achieved a reasonable level of convergence in terms of 
macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, inflation, GDP growth rates and 
interest rates. The close movement of the CPI between SACU members reflect the fact 
that the rand is a key currency in the region and it also implying the likelihood that 
members of SACU are likely to be affected by shocks in a similar way, and thus making 
these countries more suitable candidate for a currency union. 
 
Table 6.4: Correlation Matrix (CPI) 
Country        South Africa Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland____________ 
   South Africa     1                  
   Botswana          0.99**         1               
   Lesotho             0.98**         0.96**       1         
   Namibia            0.99**         0.98**       0.99**    1            
   Swaziland         1.00**         1.00**       0.98**     0.98**      1      
___________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics, 2009. 
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
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It also confirms Nielsen et al findings that the CMA countries have harmonised their 
monetary and exchange rate policies over the past years. As far as the exchange rate as 
concerned (see table 6.5), the correlation coefficient between the CMA countries is the 
same. This is not surprising since Lesotho, Namibia South Africa and Swaziland are 
members of the CMA. The correlation coefficient between the CMA group and 
Botswana is also the same: 0.98. This coefficient is very high, meaning that Botswana‟s 
exchange rate with the CMA group is highly synchronised. This is due to the fact that 
Botswana‟s currency, pula; is linked to the Rand via the currency basket, where the Rand 
weighs around 60 to 70 % (Grandes, 2003). Furthermore, this implies that the fact that 
the Rand and Pula appreciate or depreciate more or less at the same time. This 
synchronisation of the exchange rate between SACU member states makes them more 
suitable to participate in a currency area.  
 
Table 6.5: Correlation Matrix (Exchange rate) 
Country        South Africa Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland____________ 
   South Africa     1                  
   Botswana          0.98**         1               
   Lesotho             1.00**         0.98**      1         
   Namibia            1.00**         0.98**      1.00**     1            
   Swaziland         1.00**         0.98**      1.00**     1.00**       1      
___________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics, 2009. 
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
 
In terms of interest rate, once again the correlation coefficient for the CMA countries is 
positive and moving in the same direction (see table 6.6). The correlation coefficient is 
ranging from 0.960 to South Africa and Swaziland, 0.993 to South Africa and Lesotho, 
and 0.993 to Namibia and South Africa. This is inevitable because Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland have pegged their currency to the South African Rand and, thus, the South 
African Reserved Bank (SARB) determines de facto monetary policy for the CMA group 
via its interest rate policy. Botswana is moving opposite to other countries with all 
coefficients being high and negative. This is also expected due to the fact that Botswana 
pursues its own independent monetary policy.   
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Table 6.6: Correlation Matrix (Interest rate) 
Country        Botswana  Lesotho Namibia  Swaziland  South Africa___________ 
   Botswana        1                  
   Lesotho           0.957**     1               
   Namibia          0.957**     1      1         
   Swaziland       0.934**     0.961**    0.961**     1            
   South Africa   0.981**     0.993**    0.993**     0.960**       1      
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from African Development Indicators, 2009, the Central Bank of Botswana, 
    2010, the Central Bank of Lesotho, 2010, the Central Bank of Namibia, 2010, the  
     South African Reserved Bank, 2010, and the Central Bank of Swaziland.  
 
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
 
The interest rates convergence is necessary for deeper integration among the countries. 
The interest rates evaluate the similarities of monetary policy between the countries 
intending to establish a currency area. The higher the co-movements of interest rates it is 
between the countries, the lower the cost of adopting the same monetary policy. The 
results presented here, confirms the findings of other of the prior studies (such as Jenkins 
and Thomas,1997, Maleke, 2008, Matsaseng, 2008) that there is a greater degree of 
interest convergence among SACU members and the monetary integration may be more 
beneficial since the interest rates are moderately moving together between the countries.  
 
Table 6.7 below reports the correlation matrix for exports. The correlation coefficients 
for these countries are positive and very high. The coefficients are ranging from 0.88, to 
Lesotho and Swaziland, 0.87 to Botswana and Namibia, 0.86 to Botswana and Lesotho, 
Lesotho and Swaziland are closely correlated to South Africa due to the fact that most of 
their imports and exports are destined to South Africa. The result shows that South 
Africa is moving along with all countries, as the all coefficients between South Africa 
and other countries high and above 0.50. Furthermore, this shows that all members of 
SACU have relatively the same economic structure (dependent on primary product) 





Table 6.7: Correlation Matrix (Export) 
Country        South Africa Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland___________ 
   South Africa     1                  
   Botswana          0.92**         1               
   Lesotho             0.95**         0.86**      1         
   Namibia            0.81**         0.87**      0.79**     1            
   Swaziland         0.93**         0.93**      0.88**     0.81**       1      
__________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from the United Nations Statistics, 2009.  
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
 
Moving to our last variable, imports correlation matrix (see table 6.8 below), the results 
also indicate the fact that the five countries are moving in the same direction. The 
correlation coefficients are ranging from 0.95 to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 0.94 
to Lesotho and Swaziland, 0.92 to Lesotho and Namibia. Again the results demonstrate 
that South Africa, which accounts substantial share of intra-regional imports, has moved 
in the same direction with other countries. This is also not surprising due to fact that the 
BLNS countries have more similar production structures and they also trade substantially 
with their major partner South Africa.  
 
Table 6.8: Correlation Matrix (Imports) 
Country        South Africa Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland____________ 
   South Africa     1                  
   Botswana          0.85**         1               
   Lesotho             0.84**         0.95**      1         
   Namibia            0.88**         0.91**      0.92**     1            
   Swaziland         0.79**         0.95**      0.94**     0.87**       1      
___________________________________________________________________ 
Source: - Own Calculations from the United Nations Statistics, 2009.  
Note: Significant at **0.01%, *1%.  
 
The overall correlation results show that, to a degree, the variable in question are moving 
in the same direction. It result demonstrate a substantial co-movements between 
countries in terms of CPI, exchange rate and interest rate. For some historical and other 
reasons, SACU members‟ economies have been dominated by South Africa. The bulk of 
their imports originate from South Africa, and the bulk of their exports is destined for the 
103 
 
South African market or transits its economy (Grandes, 2004:48). Having noted the 
magnitude of macroeconomic convergence between members of SACU, one can argue 
that members of SACU would share similar regional shocks. Hence, this makes members 
of SACU suitable and compatible candidates for a currency (or monetary) union.  
 
6.5  Conclusion 
This chapter examined macroeconomic convergence in SACU. The inquiry was done to 
find out is GDP, GDP growth rates, consumer price index, interest rates, exports and 
imports of the SACU member states have attained certain common degree of 
convergence. It is evident from the correlation coefficients and graphical representation 
analysis that members of SACU have a higher degree of real economic convergence. The 
CMA is also playing a principal role in improving macroeconomic convergence within 
SACU area. By all accounts, members of SACU have met the economic requisites and 
are compatible candidates for establishing a common currency.  
 
The results reveal that there is a common trend among SACU member states in terms of 
economic activities. A significant interest rate and exchange rate convergence was 
observed. It is also observed a significant convergence of inflation rate, which suggest 
that the countries are undergoing similar price shocks particularly the CMA group 
countries. This suggests that, among other things, coordination of macroeconomic 
policies exists between member countries. On the strength of the evidence presented in 
this chapter and chapter five, it could be argued that SACU and its members have met the 
economic requisites for establishing a common currency and, therefore, members of 
SACU are suitable and compatible candidates for a common currency area. The next 









CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1  Conclusion 
Given SACU‟s maturity and reputation as the most efficient customs union globally, it 
has always been subject to discourse about its viability as a monetary union. In this 
study, the researcher hypothesised that SACU members can strengthen their integration 
if the OCA criteria can be satisfied, and they seem to have the economic attributes 
necessary for adopting a common currency. With its illustrious history of operational 
efficiency, SACU has demonstrated over time that it has the capacity to bring about 
meaningful regional economic integration. The financial cooperation, high degree of 
policy coordination and positive trade relations that exist within SACU are arguably all 
precursors of establishing a successful customs union. Some commentators have 
propounded the view that the requisite foundation for the formation of a currency area 
within SACU already exists. It is further argued that such currency area could herald 
greater regional economic integration in Southern Africa. Accordingly, this study has 
attempted to examine the viability of SACU as a potential customs union and the 
readiness of SACU member countries to adopt a single currency.  
 
This study has relied upon the theoretical lenses of the OCA theory to assess SACU‟s 
viability as a potential currency area. This theory reveals that the relations within SACU 
satisfy some of the technical conditions necessary for forming an optimum currency area. 
Furthermore, the empirical findings from previous studies, such as those by Aziakpono 
(2006; 2008), Grandes (2003; 2004), Jenkins and Thomas (1997), Khumfula and Huizing 
(2004), Nielsen et al. (2005), and Matsaseng (2008), confirm the feasibility of monetary 
unification and establishing a common monetary policy for the customs union. Grandes 
(2003:16) also argues that SACU members satisfy the preconditions for implementing an 
OCA. Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997) further point out that even when countries do not 
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satisfy the theoretical criteria ex ante, they can always do so ex post  i.e. once the 
currency union is established. The implication is that even in cases where the current 
configuration of the existing customs union does not readily lend itself to the formation 
of a currency area, this can be addressed through other compensatory means.  
 
The study found that the depth of financial integration, the cohesiveness of the exchange 
rate regime arrangement and the co-movement of macroeconomic variables between 
SACU. This shows there is substantial trade and financial integration among the 
members of the customs union. This could be attributed to the fact that all SACU 
members, except Botswana, are members of an ongoing monetary integration scheme 
known as the “Rand Zone”, which was forged in 1974. Again, this is critical for SACU 
member countries‟ monetary unification bid. In fact, having such a high level of 
integration could make it easier for SACU members to adapt to having policies 
collectively managed by a central regional body. 
 
Convergence in the five SACU countries‟ gross domestic product, consumer price index, 
exchange rates, exports and imports in real terms has been empirically demonstrated. 
This supports the argument that the formation of a currency (or monetary) union by 
SACU members is feasible, both in technical terms and practical terms; the only major 
impediment would be member countries‟ political will to facilitate such a move. The 
formation of a currency area translates to the establishment of a supranational authority 
that would have monopoly over trade arrangements with other trading blocs and wield 
authority over the economic policies of member countries. Thus, this issue cannot be 
framed merely as an economic issue. Its implications transcend both the economic and 
political realm. In fact, some may argue that establishing a currency area is in reality 
more politically than economically motivated. The fact that politicians will decide 
whether to establish a currency area indicates that the associated political implications 
cannot be downplayed. In the end, political forces will determine whether SACU 
countries should form a currency area, irrespective of the fact that economic conditions 
permit such a move.  
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Despite the fact that SACU countries are structurally different (McCarthy, 2008), a 
monetary arrangement may be beneficial to all SACU members Linking macroeconomic 
policies, particularly of the small-scale countries with countries that enjoy a good 
economic and financial reputation, for instance, South Africa, can yield positive results 
(Maleke, 2008). Furthermore, the empirical results suggest that, from an economic 
perspective, it is feasible for SACU countries to move towards a fully-fledge monetary 
union because of the increasing macroeconomic convergence, and this means that the 
countries are undergoing similar shocks. The deeper trade relation that exists between 
SACU member states seems to have important influence on business cycle co-
movements. Accordingly, this study concludes that a monetary union in SACU is 
feasible, as the current economic conditions within SACU permit for the formation of a 
currency area; however, its successful implementation requires the political will of 
member countries. SACU countries should learn from others‟ experiences of monetary 
integration, aiming to emulate their ideas and initiatives and to draw on their knowledge.  
 
7.2 Recommendations 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has huge potential to create meaningful 
regional economic integration and its members have already laid a strong foundation. 
Based on the conclusions above, the following recommendations should be considered. 
While a caveat is in order, a giant step for SACU in its bid for a monetary union would 
be to consolidate and capitalise on the existing monetary system through the CMA 
arrangement, and to persuade Botswana to officially get on the CMA bandwagon. This 
would assist in terms of setting up a common monetary policy and exchange control 
measures.  
 
Members of SACU must indeed continue with their efforts to cooperate and coordinate 
policies in order to strengthen regional market integration and widen the regional spatial 
perspective. Moreover, member states must further align their labour laws and patent and 
property laws in order to realise deeper integration. The benefit of policy coordination 
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and cooperation is that member countries can better administer their economies with 
more discreet policies. The interchange of sound macroeconomic policies attracts both 
local and foreign direct investment, and ultimately leads to high economic growth and 
sustained development, as demonstrated in the East Asian emerging economies. 
Furthermore, common policies will promote and sustain financial stability between 
members and steer their economies towards better economic integration. These common 
policies will ensure that the existing relationship between their fiscal policies assures 
fiscal solvency without price jumps and insulates the union against external shocks. This 
would provide a strong and necessary foundation for establishing a monetary union, as 
argued in optimal currency areas theories.  
 
However, to accomplish such policy coordination, members of SACU must establish a 
supranational institution or commission with real autonomy and policy-making 
influence, which will be fully responsible for implementing agreed treaties and enforcing 
compliance. The commission should hold regular consultations, at least twice a year, for 
the purpose of reconciling the interests of member countries on different issues 
pertaining to monetary and foreign exchange policies and trade at large. There are many 
features of the EMU and the CFA Franc zone‟s integration processes that members of 
SACU can learn from: the political goodwill, consultative processes, the shared vision, 
and compliance and commitment to the agreements and protocols. Political will is 
needed to bring about political legitimacy, the availability of public resources, and 
responsibility for policies and regulation thereof. This necessitates leadership that is 
focused on driving its local economy. Members of SACU must demonstrate political 
goodwill and commitment to the union in order to realise meaningful economic 
integration. 
 
SACU members must also focus on SMME development (appropriate labour/capital 
ratios to absorb labour) as a means to develop economic power in localities. This should 
be done in conjunction with efforts to promote the free flow of goods and services, and 
factors of production and market accessibility. Mollentze (2002:7) argues that a 
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monetary union eliminates the uncertainty that arises when the exchange rates are not 
permanently pegged, thus fuelling the flow of trade, investment and specialisation of 
production within the area. This being the case, members of SACU will be able to 
promote self-sustainable development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and 
diversify their economies into the manufacturing of exports. As Tang (2010:13) states, 
“One of the most important policy issues facing South and Southern African 
governments is how to successfully diversify their economies into the manufacturing of 
exports”. Since strategic investment in economic infrastructure is critical and essential 
for development to take its course, members of SACU have to invest in economic 
infrastructure (soft and hard infrastructure) in order to attract more local and foreign 
investment and improve the commercial environment for business.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that market integration has failed substantially on the continent, 
African countries continue to be actively involved in pursuing regional market 
integration. This is evident through various economic associations that exist in the 
continent and the overlapping of memberships. However, multiple memberships remain 
the most worrying concern for SACU, as its members are not immune to this pitfall. This 
issue should be addressed immediately; otherwise, SACU will lose its focus and thrust. 
The overlapping memberships reduce the regional economic communities‟ ability to 
pursue coherent and effective integration programmes.  
 
If South Africa withdrew its membership from SACU, it would be a great loss, 
particularly for the small-scale members. South Africa‟s contribution and investment are 
sizeable in the SACU market. The disbandment of SACU would be detrimental and a 
regressive event to all members of the customs union. Fear over its potential 
disbandment is founded on the possibility that South Africa may withdraw from SACU 
because three members (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) signed an interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU), thereby breaking ranks 
with the union. Their conduct goes against the SACU Agreement of 2002, Section 31(3), 
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which states that members are prohibited from entering new trade agreements without 
obtaining the consent of other members of the trade bloc.  
 
Members of SACU should banish the notion of protecting their individual interests, and 
all should respect and honour their declarations under the union and strive to advance 
their collective interest. The recent conduct of these three members offers an excellent 
opportunity for serious dialogue, further talks and engagement between members of the 
customs union, with a view to entrenching greater economic integration and preventing 
the dissolution of the longstanding customs union. Consequently, this needs to be 
addressed immediately in order to provide clarity on the future and functioning of 
SACU.  
 
SACU members should move towards full monetary integration. A monetary integration 
would bring a more credibility to their financial systems and clarify their commitment to 
sound macroeconomic policy management. This process should, however, be anchored 
in a shared vision, mutual interest, consultation and joint actions. As Davies argues, 
“Successful integration programmes have always been driven by a high level of 
continuing commitment on the part of the co-operating partners” (1993:220). South 
Africa, as the dominant member in terms of its economic development, is required to 
play a leading role, as Germany did in the formation of EMU.  
 
The experiences of other monetary unions (e.g. the EMU and the CFA Franc zone) show 
that forming a currency (or monetary) union is not solely concerned with which countries 
are willing to join, but also the degree to which prosperous economies are willing to 
integrate with smaller or weaker economies. Members of SACU should learn from such 
experiences. Admittedly, progress in establishing meaningful and proper economic 
integration depends, to a large extent, on the willingness of member countries to abandon 
their sovereignty. A full monetary union would further regional economic integration, 
yield additional benefits in terms of monetary policy credibility and fiscal policy 
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discipline, maintain exchange rate competitiveness, and diversify SACU members‟ 
exports, which is critical for their economic growth and development.  
 
It is important that members of SACU ensure that there is political agreement, backed by 
real commitment, not mere grandstanding rhetoric, on the move towards establishing a 
monetary union. In addition, the proponents of this issue need to further devise political 
tactics and strategies to get the attention of key political actors in the region. Getting 
Botswana to formally join SACU would be a vital political coup for the proponents of 
the monetary union and it could significantly benefit their ambitions. Given its powerful 
economy, and the prevailing dominance of the rand, it would be foolhardy to imagine 
that this issue could progress without South Africa‟s backing. Therefore, it is incumbent 
on the advocates of the customs union to consider how they could use the existing 
economic conditions that permit for the establishment of the monetary union as one of 
the measures to win over political commitment from the members‟ states. They could use 
the EMU and CFA Franc zone, which are widely touted as classic models of monetary 
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Informal monetary union. Following establishment of 
the South African Reserve Bank in 1921, the South 
African pound became the common currency. 
 
Countries became independent (except Namibia). 
The rand replaced the pound in 1961 
 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
signed the Rand Monetary Area treaty on December 
5, 1974. Swaziland set up its own monetary authority 
and introduced its national currency, the lilangeni, 
pegged at par to the rand. Botswana opted to 
withdraw from the 
RMA in 1975. 
 
Lesotho established its own central bank and issued 
its national currency, at a one-to-one rate to the rand, 
in January 1980. 
 
South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland signed the 
CMA Trilateral Agreement in April 1986, replacing 
the RMA. Additional provisions concerning capital 
account, intra-CMA fund transfers, and seigniorage 
compensation were made. Swaziland discontinued 
the use of rand as legal tender within its borders. 
 
The CMA was amended to remove exchange 
restrictions arising from the limitations on conversion 
of balances upon termination of the agreement or 
withdrawal of one party. 
 
Namibia became independent in 1990. The 
Multilateral Agreement replaced the Trilateral 
Agreement when Namibia joined the CMA in 1992. 
It issued its national currency, the dollar, in 1993. 
 
After 17 years of interruption, Swaziland 
reauthorized the use of the rand as legal tender 
alongside the lilangeni in the country. 
Arrangement became effective in 
1910. 
 
New agreement reached on 
December 11, 1969; the shares of 
the smaller members were 
determined based on a revenue-
sharing formula, with the residual 





















New revenue-sharing formula had 











The most important attributes regarding Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) 
 
     Variables 
 
                                Effect 
 
Labour mobility 
The greater the labour mobility (when wages and prices are not 
flexible) the easier it is to join/form a common currency area. 
 
Wage and price 
flexibility  
If there is wage and price flexibility in a common currency area, it will 
be easier to overcome asymmetric shocks and the common currency 




The more open the economy is, the stronger is the case for 










If there is inflation differential between countries, it will be harder to 





The higher the capital mobility, the harder it is to maintain a fixed 




A country is more likely to satisfy the criteria for entering a common 
currency area ex post than ex ante due to increased business cycle 
correlation. 
 
Similarity of shocks 
 
Costs of loosing independent monetary policy are lower the higher the 
association of shocks between the client (potential member of a 




If a country is facing monetary shocks, having a fixed exchange rate 




A country is more likely to satisfy the criteria for entering a common 
currency area ex ante than ex post due to increased specialisation of the 





If countries forming a common currency area have synchronised 






If a country has a dominant trading partner, it is beneficial to form a 





If what a country is facing are external nominal shocks, a flexible  





If what a country is facing are real shocks (domestic or foreign), a 







If countries have different labour market institutions, it will be hard to 
adjust to the same kind of shock in the same way in a common 
currency area. 
 
Credibility of monetary 
Authorities 
 
If monetary authorities do not have credibility to curb inflation, having 
a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor will be beneficial. 
Effectiveness of 
monetary policy 
If a monetary policy is not effective, the loss of monetary 
independence is not a high cost. 
International risk 
Sharing 
If a country is able to share risk with its partners in a common currency 
area, this regime could ameliorate other rigidities in the area. 
 
Usefulness of money 
 
Joining the common currency area enhances the usefulness of money, 
but the effect is that much greater the smaller and more open the 
economy is. 
 
Size of economy 
 







If exchange rate adjustments are not effective, the cost of loosing the 
exchange rate as adjustment mechanism is not significant. 




















 SACU and non-SACU-SADC Macroeconomic Indicators 
 





















Comparative Analysis of Trade Characteristics of Successful Regional Trade Blocs 




Successful Trade Blocs‟ 
Characteristics 
  
EU/NAFTA SADC COMESA SACU EAC 
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
1 Same geographical area 10/10 8/10 4/10 8/10 6/10 
2 
Geographical closed but 
with direct access 10/10 5/10 3/10 8/10 6/10 
3 
Geographical mobility 
with direct air, road & sea 
link 10/10 2/10 2/10 8/10 6/10 
4 Vast natural resources 10/10 6/10 3/10 5/10 6/10 
5 
Substantial labour 
capacity & manufacturing 
skills 10/10 2/10 2/10 3/10 3/10 
6 Entrepreneurial culture 10/10 2/10 2/10 3/10 3/10 
7 Formal treaty exists 10/10 5/10 5/10 6/10 5/10 
8 
FTA exists with 
substantial reduction of 
tariff & non-tariff barriers 
10/10 5/10 5/10 6/10 4/10 
9 Rating  80/80 35/80 26/80 49/80 42/80 









Descriptive Statistics Results 
Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) for SACU countries, 1970 - 2008 
Descriptive statistics Botswana South Africa Lesotho Namibia Swaziland 
      
Mean 95876 4531923 19156 58754 45578 
Standard Error 19068 719918 3759 10986 7537 
Median 40337 2835921 9555 27660 27745 
Standard Deviation 117542 4437873 23170 67722 46458 
Sample Variance 13816090511 19694717539242 536843269 4586296484 2158381024 
Kurtosis 0 0 0 2 -1 
Skewness 1 1 1 2 1 
Range 403001 14489175 83520 263144 158442 
Minimum 1465 500931 301 9619 2497 
Maximum 404466 14990106 83820 272763 160939 
Sum 3643284 172213070 727915 2232638 1731951 
Count 38 38 38 38 38 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 38635 1458693 7616 22260 15270 




Real GDP growth rate for SACU countries, 1971 - 2008 
Descriptive statistics Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
      
Mean 9.584210526 4.965789474 3.647368421 2.65 5 
Standard Error 1.10813317 1.263596193 0.569928458 0.371892052 1.612967543 
Median 8.1 4.3 3.35 3.05 3.05 
Mode 5.5 8.1 7.1 3.1 2.6 
Standard Deviation 6.830991631 7.789330066 3.513274967 2.292496574 9.942999711 
Sample Variance 46.66244666 60.67366287 12.343101 5.255540541 98.86324324 
Kurtosis 0.240133943 1.106558744 1.605295996 -0.6601285 14.4723619 
Skewness 0.93097254 0.420838942 0.92212354 -0.44169782 3.180763309 
Range 26.6 37 16.8 8.7 63.7 
Minimum -0.2 -10.9 -2.5 -2.1 -10.9 
Maximum 26.4 26.1 14.3 6.6 52.8 
Sum 364.2 188.7 138.6 100.7 190 
Count 38 38 38 38 38 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 2.24529106 2.560289063 1.154784737 0.753524867 3.268182654 






 Consumer Price Index (CPI) for SACU countries, 1975 - 2008 
Descriptive statistics Botswana South Africa Lesotho Namibia Swaziland 
      
Mean 45 49 53 54 46 
Standard Error 6 6 6 6 6 
Median 33 44 52 51 35 
Standard Deviation 37 37 37 37 37 
Sample Variance 1364 1363 1333 1342 1362 
Kurtosis 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Skewness 1 0 0 0 1 
Range 129 120 121 116 126 
Minimum 6 5 6 8 4 
Maximum 135 125 127 124 130 
Sum 1484 1621 1738 1778 1512 
Count 33 33 33 33 33 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 13 13 13 13 13 




Real interest rate for SACU countries, 1991 -2008 
Descriptive statistics Botswana Swaziland Lesotho Namibia South Africa 
      
Mean 16.18 15.46 15.87 15.87 16.00 
Standard Error 0.786000246 0.880107771 0.82403608 0.824036078 0.805972396 
Median 16.225 14.75 15.65 15.65 15.65 
Mode 13.4 10.5 13.4 13.4 13.4 
Standard Deviation 3.334716625 3.733981036 3.49608899 3.496088991 3.41945128 
Sample Variance 11.12033497 13.94261438 12.2226382 12.22263824 11.69264706 
Kurtosis -0.523970258 -1.047894778 -0.88781563 -0.887815628 -0.724244792 
Skewness -0.044107772 0.229870792 0.2061997 0.206199704 0.135169782 
Range 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 
Minimum 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Maximum 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 
Sum 291.25 278.2 285.63 285.63 288 
Count 18 18 18 18 18 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 1.658315549 1.856865067 1.73856414 1.738564138 1.700453101 
Source: - Own Calculations from African Development Indicators (2009), the Central Bank of Botswana,           
    (2010), the Central Bank of Lesotho (2010), the Central Bank of Namibia (2010), the South           







Inflation for SACU countries, 1980 - 2008 
Descriptive Statistics South Africa Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland 
      
Mean 72.5538571 69.48121429 73.5728214 73.07025 74.9314643 
Standard Error 8.46133666 8.579553186 9.53326684 9.22588157 9.30195773 
Median 69.5 63.813 64.894 64.449 67.442 
Standard Deviation 44.7731851 45.39872818 50.4453065 48.8187765 49.2213337 
Sample Variance 2004.63811 2061.04452 2544.72894 2383.27294 2422.73969 
Kurtosis -1.16435944 -1.22150738 -0.9575245 -1.1227183 -0.86644565 
Skewness 0.26334298 0.325586502 0.49833369 0.4473604 0.51250406 
Range 147.508 148.123 166.02 154.017 166.648 
Minimum 12.5 10.5 11.755 12.6 13.398 
Maximum 160.008 158.623 177.775 166.617 180.046 
Sum 2031.508 1945.474 2060.039 2045.967 2098.081 
Count 28 28 28 28 28 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 17.3612286 17.60378884 19.5606476 18.9299451 19.0860405 
Source: - Own calculations from IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009), Central Bank of Namibia  






































Exports Concentration Index, 1995 - 2008 
Year Botswana Lesotho Namibia 
 South 
Africa Swaziland 
1995 0.5048 0.3231 0.2988 0.2180 0.2248 
1996 0.5361 0.3201 0.2908 0.2026 0.2202 
1997 0.2452 0.3410 0.2580 0.3460 0.2217 
1998 0.2882 0.3210 0.2705 0.3249 0.2198 
1999 0.4059 0.3740 0.2900 0.1374 0.1902 
2000 0.8096 0.4794 0.4025 0.1407 0.2289 
2001 0.8289 0.2954 0.3697 0.1423 0.2663 
2002 0.7863 0.4177 0.3633 0.1133 0.3510 
2003 0.7703 0.6344 0.2558 0.1266 0.3020 
2004 0.7424 0.4420 0.2936 0.1369 0.2528 
2005 0.7362 0.5297 0.2977 0.1379 0.2308 
2006 0.7227 0.4934 0.2983 0.1557 0.2180 
2007 0.6261 0.4963 0.2499 0.1558 0.2158 
2008 0.6423 0.4942 0.2712 0.1544 0.2299 



















Real Gross Domestic Product (Millions of US dollars, constant 2005 prices), 1970 - 2008 
Year 
Countries 
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
1970 1251.319396 629.5358569 14030.96043 479751.4379 2660.654164 
1971 1464.692269 404.4491869 11520.65245 500931.1314 2497.250564 
1972 2044.040022 374.0391202 11437.74548 547302.8747 3162.966295 
1973 2301.569461 330.1949655 12439.33844 516676.6967 3481.504586 
1974 2799.119647 300.5238096 11411.13679 536808.3695 2924.331408 
1975 3006.747727 306.2705776 11697.58871 594141.2568 3970.224118 
1976 4207.107403 339.7710782 10279.46108 714350.968 4822.264809 
1977 4218.097408 388.1204216 10716.52172 713679.238 4083.391554 
1978 4956.891971 459.4393179 9618.750699 735194.1105 4487.0822 
1979 5362.800827 424.5477507 11142.71035 738891.1563 4974.675056 
1980 5845.323494 433.4531402 11956.58796 728689.7842 4398.275611 
1981 6891.221496 493.1452989 10848.99886 865093.2498 5289.429293 
1982 9112.553555 632.0944224 11733.7746 1066265.073 6628.539224 
1983 11264.07204 592.821124 11410.40694 1073837.208 6879.636995 
1984 14869.0654 851.3775581 11117.23453 1494467.838 9678.047189 
1985 23350.94139 1331.106691 28101.99898 2230300.557 15131.30402 
1986 24791.29034 1391.79001 29869.49627 2287129.037 17475.00353 
1987 24121.89269 8492.62064 27217.25828 2080710.098 17848.69983 
1988 30126.14762 10617.00135 33081.95538 2420931.916 21245.22700 
1989 40702.9578 13263.25671 38978.72236 2859677.246 26748.7846 
1990 39970.59229 13923.33211 41504.73187 2812165.189 28740.84526 
1991 47247.6626 15445.1657 46825.4722 2970718.531 31212.10645 
1992 52384.62816 16684.9836 51925.74076 3002720.951 33241.21736 
1993 60038.97863 19781.56622 58300.59728 3482859.547 39240.09752 
1994 69211.51384 22226.68028 67985.49371 3906947.042 43661.5009 
1995 73774.81315 23700.23957 72302.70162 4115220.248 46790.95155 
1996 93369.08003 30893.36545 88442.22578 5088037.166 57372.19686 
1997 108293.056 35680.48637 98788.58363 5597600.605 63513.1162 
1998 135460.6428 40870.55196 122422.0313 6750333.204 78281.31165 
1999 168242.3666 45250.07258 139854.9203 7635921.461 88890.18239 
2000 207289.1518 52716.42151 164404.5332 9034074.723 103021.1874 
2001 245624.1578 66558.91004 208840.4484 11513802.535 129100.6372 
2002 289916.7368 83820.22591 272762.5727 14614065.825 160939.1964 
2003 241088.1633 61771.62389 202577.5019 10797302.291 119971.9461 
2004 242172.4905 54952.30706 183270.6306 9640000.902 105035.9952 
2005 268029.9135 55644.12292 22984.76733 9991013.558 105670.4152 
2006 321798.1291 6610.401311 23416.86991 11234765.91 115712.5709 
2007 353469.7549 32770.43343 25016.644 12330336.250 102487.4391 
2008 404466.0546 7188.459576 26430.96433 14990106.046 113341.7932 







Real GDP, annual average of growth rate – percentage, 1971- 2008 
Year 
Countries 




1971 25.8 -9.3 5.2 4.3 4.3 6.06 
1972 26.4 19.1 2 1.7 20.7 13.98 
1973 21.3 26.1 3.9 4.6 -10.9 9 
1974 8.8 6 7.1 6.1 52.8 16.16 
1975 1.8 -8.2 2.2 1.7 20.3 3.56 
1976 19 16.5 1.5 2.2 7.2 9.28 
1977 3.6 17.6 0 -0.1 1 4.42 
1978 19.5 19.7 2.9 3 2.6 9.54 
1979 9.9 -10.9 3.8 3.8 1.8 1.68 
1980 14.3 -2.7 6.7 6.6 2.9 5.56 
1981 9.5 1 1.2 5.4 7.5 4.92 
1982 7.5 3.6 -1.1 -0.4 -1 1.72 
1983 16 -8.6 -2.5 -1.8 0.7 0.76 
1984 11.5 2.6 -0.5 5.1 8 5.34 
1985 7.2 9.4 0.2 -1.2 -8.3 1.46 
1986 7.5 2 5.5 0 2.3 3.46 
1987 8.9 5.1 14.3 2.1 14.6 9 
1988 15.3 10.6 0.2 4.2 6.6 7.38 
1989 21.1 8.1 0.9 2.4 9.1 8.32 
1990 5.5 6.4 2 -0.3 8.6 4.44 
1991 8.7 4.1 8.2 -1 2.6 4.52 
1992 6.3 4.5 7.1 -2.1 1.4 3.44 
1993 -0.2 3.6 -1.7 1.2 3.5 1.28 
1994 4 3.3 7.3 3.2 3.3 4.22 
1995 3.2 4.6 4.1 3.1 3.8 3.76 
1996 5.5 9.8 3.2 4.3 3.9 5.34 
1997 5.5 8.1 4.2 2.6 -3.6 3.36 
1998 14.5 0.3 3.3 0.5 -2.5 3.22 
1999 7.1 1.3 3.4 2.4 3 3.44 
2000 7.4 4.5 3.5 4.2 1.8 4.28 
2001 9.1 3 1.2 2.7 1 3.4 
2002 1.1 1.6 4.8 3.7 1.7 2.58 
2003 9.5 3.9 4.2 3.1 4.1 4.96 
2004 3.5 4.6 12.3 4.9 3.1 5.68 
2005 9.4 0.7 2.5 5 2.3 3.98 
2006 0.6 8.1 7.1 5.3 3.2 4.86 
2007 5.3 5.1 5.5 5.1 4 5 
2008 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.08 






Consumer Price Index (CPI), 1975 - 2008 
Year 
Countries 




1975 5.29 5.41 5.73 4.78 4.00 5.04 
1976 5.91 6.03 7.53 5.31 4.26 5.81 
1977 6.69 7.04 7.97 5.90 5.15 6.55 
1978 7.30 7.99 8.34 6.56 5.59 7.15 
1979 8.15 9.26 8.97 7.43 6.51 8.07 
1980 9.26 10.77 10.93 8.45 7.72 9.43 
1981 10.79 12.11 13.23 9.74 9.27 11.03 
1982 11.99 13.58 15.28 11.16 10.28 12.46 
1983 13.24 15.96 17.12 12.54 11.47 14.07 
1984 14.38 17.71 18.67 13.98 12.95 15.54 
1985 15.54 20.07 20.91 16.26 15.60 17.68 
1986 17.10 23.68 23.71 19.30 17.74 20.31 
1987 18.78 26.46 26.70 22.41 20.11 22.89 
1988 20.34 29.49 30.13 25.28 24.22 25.89 
1989 22.70 33.84 34.68 29.00 26.04 29.25 
1990 25.28 37.77 38.85 33.16 29.45 32.90 
1991 28.26 44.45 43.48 38.24 32.09 37.30 
1992 32.83 52.10 51.19 43.55 34.51 42.83 
1993 37.53 58.95 55.55 47.78 38.66 47.69 
1994 41.49 63.79 61.53 52.05 43.98 52.57 
1995 45.85 69.70 67.70 56.57 49.39 57.84 
1996 50.47 76.21 73.10 60.73 52.56 62.61 
1997 54.88 84.25 79.54 65.95 56.31 68.18 
1998 58.53 91.56 84.45 70.48 60.87 73.18 
1999 63.07 67.23 84.92 74.14 64.58 70.79 
2000 68.49 71.35 86.65 78.09 72.46 75.41 
2001 72.98 64.49 86.73 82.55 76.77 76.70 
2002 78.85 86.30 87.63 90.11 86.00 85.78 
2003 86.09 92.06 93.90 95.39 92.26 91.94 
2004 92.07 96.68 97.79 96.71 95.44 95.74 
2005 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2006 111.56 106.05 105.05 104.64 105.23 106.50 
2007 119.45 114.56 112.12 112.07 114.28 114.50 
2008 134.63 126.85 123.73 125.00 129.92 128.02 











Inflation rates, 1980 - 2008 
Year 
Countries 
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland Average 
1980 12.13 10.48 11.23 10.80 11.16 11.16 
1981 16.30 11.76 12.60 12.50 13.40 13.31 
1982 11.20 13.22 13.71 14.30 14.85 13.45 
1983 10.50 15.53 15.63 16.10 16.56 14.87 
1984 16.67 17.21 17.74 17.90 18.71 17.65 
1985 19.74 19.49 20.87 20.80 22.53 20.69 
1986 23.18 23.03 23.33 24.70 25.63 23.97 
1987 25.25 25.71 27.73 28.70 29.06 27.29 
1988 28.84 28.69 31.36 32.40 34.98 31.25 
1989 32.44 32.95 33.82 37.10 37.62 34.79 
1990 34.95 36.73 38.76 42.40 42.55 39.08 
1991 42.00 43.28 43.37 49.00 46.35 44.80 
1992 48.18 50.66 51.06 55.70 49.85 51.09 
1993 54.88 57.64 55.42 61.20 55.85 57.00 
1994 60.13 61.82 61.38 66.60 63.54 62.69 
1995 67.50 67.97 67.52 72.40 71.35 69.35 
1996 74.10 74.13 72.93 77.70 75.93 74.96 
1997 80.13 80.47 79.36 84.40 81.96 81.26 
1998 85.51 86.73 84.29 90.20 88.12 86.97 
1999 90.82 94.22 91.52 94.90 93.28 92.95 
2000 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2001 106.57 106.92 109.27 105.70 107.49 107.19 
2002 114.57 120.26 121.59 115.40 120.07 118.38 
2003 121.19 129.00 130.29 122.10 128.95 126.30 
2004 123.99 135.49 135.69 123.80 133.33 130.46 
2005 126.61 140.15 138.76 128.00 139.73 134.65 
2006 133.55 148.67 145.77 134.00 147.17 141.83 
2007 138.08 160.56 155.58 143.50 159.18 151.38 
2008 158.62 177.78 166.62 160.01 180.05 168.61 
Sources: IMF-International Financial Statistics (2009), Central Bank of Namibia (2010), Central Bank of  

















Real interest rates, 1991 - 2008 
Year 
Countries 
Botswana Swaziland Lesotho Namibia South Africa 
1991 19.75 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 
1992 18.25 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 
1993 15.75 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 
1994 16.25 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 
1995 18 18 18 18 18 
1996 19.8 18.9 19.8 19.8 19.8 
1997 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 
1998 22.7 21.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 
1999 16.5 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 
2000 14.5 10.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 
2001 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.4 13.4 
2002 15.5 13.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
2003 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.4 13.4 
2004 11 10.5 11 11 11 
2005 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
2006 11.8 11.5 11.8 11.8 11.8 
2007 16.2 12.9 12.88 12.88 13.8 
2008 16.5 13.7 13.7 13.7 15.2 
Source: -African Development Indicators (2009), the Central Bank of Botswana, (2010), the Central Bank 
 of Lesotho (2010), the Central Bank of Namibia (2010), the South African Reserved Bank (2010), 


















Real exchange rates (in US dollars), 1970 - 2008 
Year 
Countries 
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland Average 
1970 0.7164 0.7143 0.7164 0.7143 0.7143 0.7151 
1971 0.7152 0.7152 0.7130 0.7152 0.7152 0.7148 
1972 0.7691 0.7687 0.7728 0.7687 0.7687 0.7696 
1973 0.6941 0.6940 0.6941 0.6940 0.6940 0.6940 
1974 0.6795 0.6795 0.6795 0.6795 0.6795 0.6795 
1975 0.7395 0.7395 0.7395 0.7395 0.7395 0.7395 
1976 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 
1977 0.8420 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8640 
1978 0.8282 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8696 0.8613 
1979 0.8150 0.8420 0.8420 0.8420 0.8418 0.8366 
1980 0.7772 0.7788 0.7788 0.7788 0.7788 0.7785 
1981 0.8367 0.8775 0.8776 0.8776 0.8764 0.8692 
1982 1.0297 1.0858 1.0858 1.0858 1.0858 1.0746 
1983 1.0969 1.1141 1.1141 1.1141 1.1141 1.1107 
1984 1.2984 1.4753 1.4753 1.4753 1.4753 1.4399 
1985 1.9026 2.2287 2.2287 2.2287 2.2229 2.1623 
1986 1.8791 2.2850 2.2850 2.2850 2.2850 2.2039 
1987 1.6789 2.0360 2.0360 2.0360 2.0360 1.9646 
1988 1.8286 2.2735 2.2735 2.2735 2.2735 2.1845 
1989 2.0149 2.6227 2.6227 2.6227 2.6227 2.5011 
1990 1.8605 2.5873 2.5873 2.5873 2.5873 2.4419 
1991 2.0216 2.7613 2.7613 2.7613 2.7613 2.6134 
1992 2.1097 2.8520 2.8520 2.8520 2.8520 2.7036 
1993 2.4231 3.2677 3.2677 3.2677 3.2677 3.0988 
1994 2.6846 3.5508 3.5508 3.5508 3.5508 3.3776 
1995 2.7722 3.6271 3.6271 3.6271 3.6271 3.4561 
1996 3.3242 4.2993 4.2993 4.2993 4.2993 4.1043 
1997 3.6508 4.6080 4.6080 4.6080 4.6080 4.4165 
1998 4.2259 5.5283 5.5283 5.5283 5.5283 5.2678 
1999 4.6244 6.1095 6.1095 6.1095 6.1095 5.8125 
2000 5.1018 6.9398 6.9398 6.9398 6.9398 6.5722 
2001 5.8412 8.6092 8.6092 8.6092 8.6092 8.0556 
2002 6.3278 10.5407 10.5407 10.5407 10.5407 9.6982 
2003 4.9499 7.5647 7.5647 7.5647 7.5647 7.0418 
2004 4.6929 6.4597 6.4597 6.4597 6.4597 6.1063 
2005 5.1104 6.3593 6.3593 6.3593 6.3593 6.1095 
2006 5.8366 6.7715 6.7715 6.7715 6.7715 6.5846 
2007 6.1388 7.0454 7.0454 7.0454 7.0454 6.8641 
2008 6.8269 8.2612 8.2612 8.2612 8.2612 7.9743 







Real exports (Millions of US dollars, constant 1990 prices), 1970-2008 
Year 
Countries 
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
1970 77805113.01 22119998.97 905515861.61 21932627911.48 120611330.29 
1971 131621752.68 26776840.89 953508985.51 22608623320.02 116181523.88 
1972 194625161.14 31433682.82 972344079.07 23286906658.87 145117107.02 
1973 236330522.11 32597893.37 1009128330.58 22080287413.63 150411317.42 
1974 295440493.76 31821752.96 1084467431.70 21000208313.86 230045680.05 
1975 303729718.80 24060349.79 1106924932.93 20756807728.07 248550944.02 
1976 408233026.67 32597893.37 1116528653.45 21649100547.99 278829216.36 
1977 506216197.86 23284209.51 1136093693.11 22645406199.58 242249848.03 
1978 575854884.27 52777541.51 1149823337.60 23392151453.01 239311471.21 
1979 654911546.01 68300347.86 1171261184.93 23822634340.10 243137672.17 
1980 655545448.49 74466090.31 1358939413.60 23821930361.54 275725879.13 
1981 764486072.19 63809735.99 1224452413.20 22546673207.08 321609748.56 
1982 707344315.08 64451685.00 1178106123.88 21950403370.02 278889520.51 
1983 1103442642.33 44936433.74 1042377704.89 21658780253.14 263232676.43 
1984 1341246530.78 48788128.10 1051067634.13 22236218663.82 254078021.36 
1985 1294790553.96 49943636.46 1368043149.04 24476982408.04 56513314.42 
1986 1573435856.49 52383042.85 1540600315.72 23573777920.50 383489533.16 
1987 1565647915.24 70486006.15 1449562961.62 24669696537.79 519636543.18 
1988 2130183116.75 88156435.77 1391630099.95 26685187144.04 518961714.64 
1989 2126470261.06 94109448.23 1570580582.17 27267201415.34 621258882.23 
1990 1966335492.14 87380693.99 1397104225.90 27148933017.91 620039087.28 
1991 2090390517.25 94142559.14 1799817195.74 26729361798.44 674021075.37 
1992 2098022387.84 114220677.59 1913550419.11 21466510706.50 660095927.96 
1993 1895543528.21 131317348.94 2118447237.83 31123595945.93 689216394.16 
1994 2062205653.17 137938468.90 1926628642.22 31897092384.50 687280962.61 
1995 2166531418.63 141767104.56 2146670397.16 35386010108.77 729844866.14 
1996 2364841081.18 174826868.07 1734265289.25 37935116460.59 730125986.22 
1997 2634597849.84 206667212.61 1687560110.42 39943919270.56 921654328.13 
1998 2803472983.00 221853041.00 1675749605.44 41240647770.99 903780132.82 
1999 2278275698.97 198810515.39 1750102102.67 41760711929.35 899911259.00 
2000 3165883729.56 247903076.42 1542948904.89 45232558173.64 1040076334.95 
2001 3280505822.81 295439919.24 1501706189.40 46314925203.72 1201622224.57 
2002 2790924592.67 423723649.80 1745509556.14 46773039249.13 1374741198.63 
2003 3163024326.46 499190474.19 1899992984.76 46824253689.09 1509493521.07 
2004 2894817304.48 606485016.36 2002157082.86 48168676736.70 1308807589.96 
2005 3420976007.58 574096211.98 1985542160.34 52020495406.67 1370604010.29 
2006 3739506499.69 628112348.99 2289442055.38 55166223584.82 1245654704.31 
2007 4183494526.70 719442184.33 2310181249.46 59312481285.90 1277085149.71 
2008 4269850523.51 729871245.86 2622045639.83 60348385731.28 1196002542.09 







Real imports (Millions of US dollars, constant 1990 prices), 1970-2008 
Year 
Countries 
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
1970 173641038.09 162218345.45 1081172575.97 19693679929.10 128939051.75 
1971 220809038.87 199653348.25 1137284632.90 21680159130.65 116354423.31 
1972 290218536.68 263179413.49 1160496319.76 18958477998.97 156941321.69 
1973 340664661.63 302883204.38 1206633386.90 21088678463.21 148458945.07 
1974 413270689.23 347691768.30 1289428233.23 25097889426.95 190795394.26 
1975 420508354.66 477012687.01 1323668534.01 24272781146.38 239974023.33 
1976 462653721.53 579108149.10 1342517277.84 21844826317.28 307976359.33 
1977 519215167.46 583078528.20 1328185084.47 18857131951.62 314728037.75 
1978 559233572.15 605766408.63 1398621166.25 18874210935.75 407645363.24 
1979 675743848.82 677233232.22 1432066673.47 18693109254.96 474402974.85 
1980 711271999.39 628417742.89 1461563340.10 22258911121.23 457979852.95 
1981 764997495.54 673637980.26 1675087316.16 25316371525.84 528849196.93 
1982 782249524.40 711680402.18 1464459983.10 20919660969.30 453416945.75 
1983 756804751.05 695350872.08 1234797567.03 17553167625.39 453572247.86 
1984 772244922.97 714730973.79 1235211373.22 21028579773.76 443206548.00 
1985 916957146.29 696965880.56 1299351327.21 18076976846.27 104699351.34 
1986 901044316.19 634698331.47 1367629342.77 17633728871.30 526346101.52 
1987 953115508.01 679200787.34 1473149912.34 18249861279.98 589310310.88 
1988 1150923015.99 823746031.70 1415217050.67 22248115914.28 650907548.53 
1989 1482414053.03 858525425.25 1831680199.84 22319009810.68 774856759.49 
1990 1748970575.92 855183719.58 1813978530.82 21016334464.38 758670198.03 
1991 1818860609.80 936607055.78 1865755912.72 28196981093.37 858674092.13 
1992 1546596711.71 971176749.09 1966212884.21 22614508460.66 894726782.84 
1993 1355535191.55 1033869534.52 1946741048.38 24201403882.51 936073800.48 
1994 1466330910.05 1005432725.26 1962803171.57 28096217877.06 865672900.35 
1995 1499992982.96 1107060191.39 2241719295.15 32813723314.80 797374989.75 
1996 1515332642.27 1192046066.16 2196753927.55 35671875197.04 1004482031.22 
1997 1891702546.58 1204874671.87 2272180107.12 37592938666.91 989743006.35 
1998 2354623773.16 1166703163.16 2446116635.11 38349892133.44 1140617402.84 
1999 2550146316.85 1113299681.51 2480206047.29 35143232301.41 1125120753.11 
2000 2451809823.34 1091406951.13 1753168917.51 37019020351.08 1231618178.50 
2001 2374050589.12 1150193706.07 2003335446.06 37111504661.38 1384977575.27 
2002 2226758909.64 1315097966.69 2126474410.90 39093794678.13 1451131787.88 
2003 2371645159.00 1295529319.25 2349892092.55 42254373477.50 1523726684.11 
2004 2517611621.53 1349632489.17 2116104813.86 48383634188.49 1347953847.20 
2005 2598289184.34 1386714145.81 2135783480.96 53389710009.07 1435524182.20 
2006 2401153034.04 1388214738.87 2484343345.06 63504013310.02 1284561816.08 
2007 2769949151.96 1508475290.69 3074939030.94 69875924493.68 1298868667.00 
2008 3384769175.29 1718023523.31 3169346644.53 71433495622.02 1412720590.09 
Source: United Nations Statistics (2009). 
 
